In recent times, social media platforms have become important tools for PD with more than 200 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and foreign ministers active on Twitter. The targets of PD have also undergone some fundamental changes. The target of influence and manipulation is no longer the foreign audience alone but now includes the domestic public as well. A “Returning Power” like China² – eager to rebrand itself through PD – regards social media tools like Twitter (now known as X), YouTube, and Weibo, along with the others, to be highly effective in this respect.

Having blocked Western social media platforms like Twitter, Google, Facebook (FB), and WhatsApp, China employs homegrown alternatives in its PD. Local networks like Sina Weibo, the most popular online platform in China that functions similar to Twitter, Baidu, a Chinese parallel to Google, WeChat, an app similar to WhatsApp, and Renren, a net equivalent to FB, are aggressively and extensively deployed to connect with the domestic audience. However, despite the preference for its homegrown platforms, a fascinating dimension of China’s social media landscape is the state’s willingness to embrace Western platforms like Twitter and YouTube wherever and whenever necessary, for reaching out to the digitized global community.

In addition to adopting Western social media platforms in an agenda-specific fashion, Beijing also consciously employs China-owned TV channels like the CGTN (formerly known as the CCTV-News and CCTV-9) with an eye toward influencing and manipulating the foreign English-speaking audience. Based in Washington, the CGTN is not only a 24/7 English language station, but is also active on Twitter with the purpose of shaping perceptions in the Western world and beyond. Although CGTN’s audience in the U.S. is still minimal, it is considered important for promoting China’s brand abroad. There are other similar Chinese news channels available on Western social media platforms like the Global Times and the China Daily, as well. These “glocal” (global and local) platforms provide the state an opportunity to get noticed and be heard – making international and domestic engagement imperative and on its own terms. The Chinese leadership skillfully controls and frames contents for communicating state narratives to the targeted audience, aligned to its “national security.”

The reach of digital technologies and its power to influence, monitor and manipulate global perceptions, has been significant in shaping China’s PD while helping to construct international and domestic public opinion (PO) on major global issues. This article examines Beijing’s contemporary PD employing both foreign and local social media platforms like Twitter and YouTube on the one hand, and Weibo on the other. It analyzes occasions when the Chinese state has preferred one platform over the other and attempts to identify the circumstances that influence the choice.

Twitter (now X)

Officially plugged into the virtual community since 1994, China’s new media landscape is unique in its attempt to alter the social and political fabric of the country and for transforming its conduct of PD. China’s general rejection of many widely used Western platforms, including FB and WhatsApp, for domestic use has been a part of its overall media strategy based on the conviction that the Western media has been unfair to China. Unfairness is characterized by playing up its weaknesses, exaggerating its potential as a regional threat, and ignoring its achievements. However, China’s embrace of Twitter for connecting with the international online public demonstrates a realist streak, for example during the COVID-19 pandemic. To present an alternate perspective and favorable stories on China to the outside world, Chinese diplomats used Twitter – which has been banned in China since 2009 – to communicate with foreign audiences without hesitation. The outbreak of the Coronavirus was an occasion when Beijing was heavily engaged in Twitter-driven PD, largely forced by the fact that the pandemic was proving heavily damaging to its global reputation and hurting its brand. Encountering sharp global criticism over claims that it intentionally misled the world by covering up the true extent of the damage caused by the virus first detected in Wuhan, China decided to use Twitter to rebut foreign criticism. Data from the official Twitter accounts of various Chinese embassies and spokespeople revealed that official Chinese Twitter activity had gone into overdrive during the pandemic and continued thereafter, indicating China’s desire to influence and shape the narrative on the virus via the platform.³

How exactly did China go about shaping the broader narrative in its support? Domestically, a major state priority emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic. Airwaves and chatrooms were inundated with government-friendly “positive” content, and at the same time stricter internet controls regarding sensitive issues were instituted.

Given that China’s PD system operates under the principle of democratic centralism, implying state control, its international communication has been distinct and conforms to propaganda tactics. Since Xi Jinping’s assumption of office in 2012, China has witnessed a rise in media policing while its control over its cyberspace has increased significantly. During the pandemic, Beijing’s assertive dominance of cyberspace, including online propaganda, was highly conspicuous. A seven-month investigation by the Associated Press and the Oxford Internet Institute revealed that China’s “rise on Twitter has been powered by an army of fake accounts” used “for amplifying propaganda that can reach hundreds of millions of people – often without disclosing the fact that the content is government-sponsored.”⁴

As part of its wider digital diplomacy strategy, senior Chinese diplomats were urged to amplify and spin messages regarding the origins of COVID-19⁵  with Twitter playing a major role. The platform was embraced as an effective “crisis messaging tool”⁶ for pushing out swift rebuttals targeting the global audience in real time. An assertive external information campaign was launched, including wolf warrior diplomacy,⁷ to not only influence global perceptions for deflecting blame from Beijing’s own failings, but also for highlighting missteps of other governments, which would thus portray China as both the model and partner of first resort for other countries. The campaign focused on promoting and amplifying positive narratives about the Communist Party of China (CCP) while suppressing information unfavorable to it.⁸

It is important to note though that the social media ecology makes its total control by the CCP almost impossible. Notwithstanding the tight internet control that China exercises, the “ephemeral, anonymous, and networked nature of internet communication”⁹ has also given rise to an active civil society which has resisted internet control and aggressively used local online platforms for expressing public discontent, opinions, and alternate views criticizing the government and its anti-COVID policies.¹⁰ Even the official press erupted in outrage over the government’s mishandling of the virus during the early days of the pandemic, a revealing indication of how fragile the Party’s control over information had become. This gives a sense of a disconcerted leadership uncomfortable with the online criticism resorting to employing the internet police to threaten the public posting about its failure to handle the pandemic.¹¹ The domestic frustration over COVID -19 – pervading social media at the same time when China was using Twitter to project a more positive account of managing the pandemic – underscores a dimension of frailty of social media that in certain situations might make digital tools risky alternatives for achieving specific strategic goals.

‘Glocal’ Platforms for Promoting a ‘Benign’ Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

China’s efforts to control information flow stems from authoritarian tendencies¹² that are connected to its history outside of contemporary ideology. In fact, the ban of the Western online platforms in China can also be viewed from a great power status perspective.

The First Opium War (1839 – 42) not only denied China its historical great power status, but also eroded China’s confidence and self-respect throughout an ensuing century of foreign humiliation. This directly contributed to the development of “post-imperial ideology”¹³ and had long-lasting implications for diplomatic strategy. Contemporary power politics and the polymedia landscape has further altered its internal and external communication approach. The reality of a hostile world order uncomfortable with China’s “rise” has been compelling enough to push Beijing to try to improve its global image while simultaneously attempting to shape a favorable domestic and international PO.

Beijing’s use of “glocal” platforms like Twitter and YouTube on the one hand, and Weibo on the other, for promoting its flagship BRI or the One Belt One Road (OBOR), is a classic example of a leadership trying to impress its “non-threatening character” upon the “glocal” public. In response to the international community growing increasingly wary of the geostrategic implications of the mega project, initially launched in 2013 to strengthen infrastructure, trade, and investment links between China and other parts of the world, Beijing eventually recast it as an ideological initiative to promote shifting the balance of geopolitical power in China’s favor.¹⁴ Emphasizing the project’s resolve to pursue “a better cross-cultural dialogue, broad shared interest,” and a “deeper understanding of different localities in a world map of civilizations,” the BRI was picked up as a key effort of China’s PD. Indeed, communicating right with the purpose of conveying China’s benign intent behind the BRI for influencing global PO has evolved as a critical goal for the leadership for implementing the new Silk Road. An example of the considerable effort to sustain this image in the South Asian region is the Chinese Ambassador’s highly visible activity in Maldives on both social and traditional media platforms to counter debt-trap diplomacy allegations.¹⁵ Similar tendencies are visible in Nepal as well, where digital outreach has helped Beijing counter negative reactions regarding its growing economic and military clout in the country.

The Chinese leadership has also used hashtags for creating collective conversations¹⁶ about the BRI’s controversial international perception. Beijing launched its first online Friends of #BRI forum in February 2021 for sharing knowledge, experience, opportunities and understanding of the OBOR to develop lasting collaborations with partners. It has also been pushing Belt and Road Bedtime Stories – a series of films produced by China Daily targeting overseas children through its YouTube channel, a platform inaccessible in China but accessible outside the mainland. This is yet another example underscoring the state’s flexibility and willingness to embrace domestically proscribed Western platforms like YouTube (blocked in China since 2009) for the purpose of demonstrating its arguably “benign” intentions to the global community.

Notwithstanding the Beijing leadership’s attempts to reboot the BRI, China’s overt influence operations to generate support for such projects have unsettled many. This is specifically visible in countries like Kazakhstan where Beijing’s PD seems to have “succeeded in shoring up the support of Kazakhstan’s political elites,” but “has fallen short of its aspirations to strengthen ties with the average Kazakh.”¹⁷ Responding to anti-China online campaigns by domestic nationalist groups over the project, Kazakh authorities set up an information ministry to control the spread of such disinformation, particularly those related to Beijing. This was partly motivated by the rapid increase in China’s investments in Kazakhstan’s key strategic sectors, which now exceed those of Russia.

BRI-focused PD targets both the foreign and domestic audiences alike. Beijing has been mindful of engaging its domestic constituencies, including the youth on the subject as well, showing how critical the domestic audience is in shaping Chinese diplomacy and foreign policy-making. A promotion video titled Belt and Road is How on official Chinese social media channels demonstrates the leadership’s equal focus on the local audience on the issue.¹⁸ In fact, the wide sharing of the We Make it Happen promo on Weibo specifically targeted the Chinese youth. The People’s Daily deployed another video, The Belt and Road-We Make it Happen, to communicate China’s international efforts to the local viewers. This is in line with Robert D. Putnam’s explanation that foreign policy decision-making is influenced by a two-level interaction between diplomacy and domestic policy, which functionally pushes leaderships, at least occasionally, to communicate with the domestic public on foreign policy and PD matters.

While employing local online platforms is deemed critical for shaping and building domestic support for the government’s policies, they are also useful for communicating strength and confidence abroad. The latter holds traction for connecting with the Chinese youth as well. In fact, the splash created on social media around the CCP’s centenary celebration in 2021 targeted both. While conveying strength to the foreign audience, it was also an attempt to reconnect with domestic youth – many of whom favor an aggressive foreign policy on certain foreign policy matters.¹⁹ The #China Communist Party Founding 100 Anniversary not only appeared over 11.7 billion times on Weibo but also on other platforms such as WeChat and Baidu, all of which revised their websites to mark the Party’s centenary. As foreign embassies in China embraced local platforms like Weibo to connect and communicate with the local online public, several hashtags were also used to push China’s powerful brand abroad.

Digital Tools and Winter Olympics 2022

Beijing’s major PD goals include national identity building and promotion, and it actively engages in these through vigorous employment of tech platforms. The CCP centenary celebrations were designed and orchestrated online in part for whipping up emotions of the Chinese youth, many of whom prefer not to be aligned with the “red gene.” The government’s priority has thus been to promote a China brand that all can relate to and take pride in. The Winter Olympics organized in 2022 was one of the many occasions in recent history manifesting “glocal” promotion of the China brand. Such megasport events provide contemporary states the opportunity to showcase their abilities and promote their brands at home and abroad.

The Winter Games was aggressively marketed using digital media to communicate China’s benign and confident image both domestically and internationally. On Twitter, the state media outlets, journalists, as well as diplomats, tried to promote the image of the Games, raving about venues and glorifying the Olympic mascot. The state media, including China Daily, even claimed that the mascot, Bing Dwen Dwen, a giant panda wearing a suit of ice, had not only dominated all discussions on Weibo but was enormously popular with the foreign public as well. However, these assertions ran into credibility problems when The New York Times and ProPublica identified more than 3,000 inauthentic-looking Twitter accounts that appeared to be coordinating to promote the Olympics by sharing state media posts with identical comments amplifying official Chinese voices.²⁰

On the Outcomes

The Chinese leadership has been mindful of the information and communication revolution which has placed the public at the center of diplomatic efforts. With online platforms making the “glocal” audience equal partners and participants in diplomacy, Beijing has demonstrated its efforts to adopt social media platforms for increased communication and diplomacy. However, given its political system, its efforts to change how it is perceived by others through online platforms ring of propaganda. In fact, such assertiveness when communicated through the use of new tools and technology indicates a synergy of censorship and propaganda to manage unfavorable opinions on China.

China’s digitalization process has been amplifying the state’s capacity to monitor others and has also been formidable in manipulating and controlling narratives that fit their national agendas. Utilizing such PD and political communication, Chinese state behavior has muddied the “glocal” perception of China, despite the promise that new technology would strengthen and perpetuate democracy. Beijing has not hesitated to exploit online search engines to disseminate state-backed media information that amplifies the CCP’s agenda in pursuit of influencing and manipulating audiences around the world. Fake accounts, fake stories, and vigorous promotion of “wolf warriors” have complicated the online media landscape and led tech giants like Twitter to increase their scrutiny of the Chinese media. The dominant perception of China remains that of a “surveillance state” trying to reassert its dominance “glocally,” while manipulating the social media tools for influence-building and control of the domestic and foreign POs.

The post Public Diplomacy Through Social Media: the Chinese Way appeared first on China Research Center.

The employment of culture as a foreign policy tool in present-day politics in China is a combination of both academic effort and the leadership’s genuine compulsion to open channels of communication with the international community. This paper tracks use of culture as a soft power tool in Chinese history while underlining the leadership’s pragmatic understanding of the concept and underscoring its application worldwide. The Confucius Institutes (CIs) have played a major role in the global transmission of Chinese language and culture. This paper also reflects on the mandate of these Institutes and argues that China’s CD is a far more strategically ambitious exercise than the mere export of its rich cultural heritage.

Cultural Diplomacy: An Ancient Chinese Legacy

CD is widely used by modern states for enhancing soft power. Soft power, popularized in the contemporary discourse on international relations by Joseph Nye, focuses on diplomatic engagement for strategic dividends. Several prominent political thinkers, e.g. Foucault, Bourdieu, Gramsci, Habermas and E.H. Carr, also have variously expounded on the concept prior to Nye. As a conceptual identity, soft power and the role of culture in its use are hardly limited to the western political discourse. Indeed, the prevalent impression of China’s modern soft power strategy for connecting with the rest of the world being essentially an emulation of similar strategies pursued by major western powers overlooks the fact that soft power was strongly embedded in ancient Chinese history and philosophy. The specific period in Chinese history that can be identified for its distinct emphasis on spread of harmony and amity is the Spring and Autumn era (771 BC – 476 BC), also known as the Hundred Schools of Thought. Marked by significant cultural and intellectual developments, the historical thoughts of the period remain relevant in the modern era and are reflected in the contemporary Chinese articulation of soft power and its emphasis on CD. Thus, recognizing culture as an effective instrument of soft power and modern statecraft is an example of the pragmatism characterizing contemporary Chinese foreign policies.

According to the literature of the Hundred Schools of Thought, China’s ancient strategists preferred diplomatic maneuvering to secure state objectives and were averse to territorial expansion by force. Kong Zi or Confucius (551 BC – 479 BC) stressed the limitation and regulation of power. Rather than war, Confucius’ teachings focused on education and humanity. Mencius (372 BC – 289 BC), another great thinker of the time, also denounced wars with the idea that benevolent kings who could easily win over masses had no enemies.² The Confucius-Mencius political construct rejected the need for possessing large territories for enhancing state prestige. The Chou kingdom (1027 BC – 256 BC), for example, was hardly large but was nonetheless able to retain its dynastic command for eight hundred years—the longest for any Chinese dynasty.³

Along with Confucianism, the doctrine of Taoism and Mohism also emphasized “universal love” and the virtues of discussion and persuasion for solving problems. Lao Zi, another ancient Chinese philosopher who wrote the main texts of Taoism along with Zhuang Zi, discounted wars, with the latter emphasizing education and humility. Ideas such as culture winning over an enemy and winning a battle before it is fought are replete in ancient Chinese writings. The celebrated military strategist, Sun Zi (722 BC – 481 BC), in The Art of War, argued for attacking the enemy’s mind rather than his fortified cities. Indeed, Chinese ancient philosophy and history rarely espoused hard power and focused on cultivating friends as opposed to engaging in conflicts. Later Chinese history obviously produced different strategies and priorities dictated by national interests of the time. Nonetheless, soft power and CD – conspicuous in modern China’s strategic engagement – are essentially products of its ancient history and tradition, not emulations of western experiences.

The Academic Discourse on Culture

China’s communication with the world was largely intermittent until the late 1980s. Prolonged isolation by the international community, a vocal discourse in the West labeling China as a destabilizing force, and the increasing spread of the “China collapse” theory after the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 led China to seriously contemplate positive image-building. A nascent interest in soft power began taking shape in the 1990s with scholars and academics deliberating the virtues of dialogue and interaction. Wang Huning was one of the earliest exponents of soft power. Earlier with the Fudan University and currently a member of the Communist Party’s Poliburo and the Director of the Policy Research Office of the Party’s Central Committee, Wang was probably the first contemporary Chinese scholar to argue that culture is the main source of a state’s soft power.⁴ The view was endorsed by other scholars such as Xiang Shu Yong⁵ and Zhao Chang Rong⁶ with both identifying culture and language as instrumental in enhancing strategic strength of a nation.

The modern Chinese literature on soft power is conspicuous by its ideological flavor and pronounced emphasis on culture. Discussing soft power, Rong distinguishes between western and Chinese cultures and argues that while the former stresses hegemony, Chinese culture based on Confucianism seeks peaceful solutions to international problems.⁷ Several of his peers argue the western culture’s focus on materialism, science, individualism, and industrialization are producing clashes and disharmony, while traditional Chinese principles such as “putting people first” and “harmony between nature and mankind”⁸ are more effective in solving complex international problems. Modern Chinese writings regard China’s indigenous culture imbibing Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, Mohism, and other classical schools of thought as embodying the softer aspects of China’s national power. In this regard, concepts such as winning respect through virtues, benevolent governance, peace, and harmony without suppressing differences are repeatedly highlighted.

Culture in Official Pronouncements

Chinese culture retains ancient characteristics while accommodating changes. Culture has been influenced by politics and has acquired diverse undertones under different leaders. While Mao Zedong relegated Confucian teachings to the background during the Cultural Revolution (1965-75), the subsequent generation of leaders adopted Confucianism almost passionately. Whether it be Jiang Zemin’s “rule by virtue” (yi de zhi guo) or Hu Jintao’s “harmonious society” (he xie she hui), Confucian ideals are embedded in modern China’s state vision for underscoring and achieving various national objectives. Mao highlighted the congruence of culture and politics decades ago: “There is no such thing as art for art’s sake. Proletarian art and literature are… as Lenin said, cogs and wheels in the whole revolutionary machine.”⁹ In the same vein, he emphasized that the Party would not hesitate to harness literature and art for achieving national interests. Mao’s emphasis was on the creation of what he termed a New Democracy—national and anti-imperialistic—for advancing the dignity and independence of the Chinese nation, not the individual. This national and anti-imperialistic flavor continues to condition Chinese contemporary thinking on the role of culture, albeit with modern connotations.

Mao’s vision of cultural exclusiveness gave way to a more receptive outlook toward cultural diversity with emphasis on coexistence and harmony during the Hu-Wen period (2003-13). Premier Wen aptly reflected: “…Cultural diversity is an objective reality in this world and only when the diversity of cultures is respected, will civilizations progress.”¹⁰ This is a marked departure from past when culture was defined as “class culture,” identified more with the “ruling elite,” and to be employed for serving workers, peasants, and soldiers. The current new leadership is also showing signs of pursuing an accommodating and pragmatic cultural policy in keeping with larger national interests of holding “high the banner of peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit….”¹¹ The Resolution adopted at the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of China in November 2012 was emphatic about upholding China’s cultural heritage: “The country’s cultural soft power should be improved significantly”¹² for mutual understanding. Subsequently, the Communiqué of the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress held in November 2013 offered similar emphasis. While highlighting “putting people first,” the Communiqué stressed cultural openness while strengthening “national cultural soft power.”¹³ The message is clear. China is eager to project itself as a responsible stakeholder in the international community by employing culture.

The contemporary avatar of culture has been in vogue for a decade or so. While the 18th Congress explicitly highlighted the role of culture in shaping foreign policy, the 11th Five Year Plan (2006-10) urged a bigger presence for China in the international cultural markets.¹⁴ Beijing is determined to push deep into the global culture market in particular to communicate China to western audiences. Efforts for achieving this objective by “connecting people and building platforms for introducing writers…” have been called critical and hailed “as important as high-level government dialogues.”¹⁵ China has also tried to project Zheng He’s voyages during the Ming dynasty as an example of China’s cultural tradition of friendship in international relations. According to Huang Ju, former Vice Premier and a member of the Standing Committee of the Party’s Politburo, “Zheng He’s voyages facilitated cultural, economic, and trade exchanges across the globe, helped establish friendly ties, and contributed to the world’s navigation cause.”¹⁶

China’s leadership, however, is still wary of the western “cultural onslaught” and “hegemonism.” In Seeking Truth (March 2012 issue) — the Party’s flagship magazine — Hu cautioned: “We must clearly see that international hostile forces are intensifying the strategic plot of westernizing and dividing China, and ideological and cultural fields are the focal areas of their long-term infiltration.”¹⁷ The Report of the 18th Party Congress underlined similar concerns. Reportedly drafted by a team headed by Xi Jinping, it warns of the continued presence of “hegemonism” and “power politics” in the world in what is probably a veiled reference to the United States and its allies.¹⁸ These perceptions have been influencing China’s cultural strategy. Aspiring to play a major power role in future global politics, China realizes that its cultural rise will augment its strategic rise. It is hardly accidental that almost all major world powers are leading global cultural hubs as well. Expanding global cultural presence therefore is a priority. The primary focus, while upping cultural communication with the rest of the world, is to charm the West through a markedly different, Oriental brand of culture. This effort will also add a distinct dimension to global culture and might reduce the western cultural hegemony over time.

Confucius Institutes as Cultural Ambassadors

With culture increasingly identified as “a mission more arduous and critical to guard national cultural security and to boost national soft power and Chinese culture’s international influence,”¹⁹ Confucius Institutes have spread globally. The implicit strategic objective behind the proliferation of CIs can be traced to the vision of China nursed by a core group of foreign affairs decision-makers in the Party’s Central Committee (zhong yang wai shi gong zuo ling dao xiao zu) emphasizing a globally benign image of China.²⁰ Confucian teachings and principles with their unequivocal focus on humanity, education and harmony are expected to bind ethnic Chinese all across the world and attract other countries to China, through their non-dogmatic virtuous appeal. Indeed, Confucian thoughts are most representative tenets of a “global” doctrine that the CPC is comfortable in identifying with and disseminating across the world. Taking off in 2004, the CIs were originally designed to promote Chinese language and culture. Over time their mandate expanded from cultural interaction and exchanges to academic collaboration. Their programs now depend on the scope demanded by host countries. The largest number of CIs is in North America. Some of these step beyond their usual domains of promoting cultural interactions to assume advanced academic roles, such as the one at Stanford University, which apart from language training also focuses on research and literature of the Tang dynasty for discerning the cultural saliences of the period. The CIs at Chicago and Columbia Universities also declare themselves “research-oriented.”²¹ The advanced academic roles are hardly noticeable among CIs in Asia. Aligned with the Chinese Government and its programs overseen by the Hanban (Office of Chinese Language Council International), CIs have emerged as China’s cultural ambassadors with varied agendas.

The propagation of CIs began in South Korea, which in many ways was an ideal ground for launching “Brand Confucius” given the Korean peninsula’s long history of following the Confucian system of thought, society, and governance. South Korea’s significance as an economic partner for China and the importance of not allowing territorial tensions to damage economic ties was also responsible for launching CD through a CI. Furthermore, the fact that South Korea is a major U.S. ally and a conduit for facilitating extra-regional presence in the region made the country and the geography perfect for communicating China’s arrival on the world stage, through a dedicated policy of cultural engagement and with a loud and clear message: China was back into the “first world club after a century of semi-colonial status and fifty years of third world membership.”²²

CIs in South Asia – China’s western neighborhood with complicated regional dynamics – are much fewer compared with some other parts of Asia. India’s dominant presence in the neighborhood and its overarching and deep-rooted cultural influence in the region probably have motivated a relatively low-key cultural engagement strand from China to minimize any potential clash of cultures among the two occasionally estranged neighbors. CIs in the region have confined themselves to teaching Mandarin, organizing limited cultural events, and occasional study tours and education exchanges. CIs have been rather active in their teaching and cultural communication functions in Central Asia – a key region for China given its strategic location and vast natural resources. The CI at the Tajik National University, for example, had 2,000 registered students learning Mandarin in 2011 and is an important platform for cultural exchanges and interactions between China and Tajikistan since its inception in March 2009.²³ CIs have sprung up fast in Africa as well – another strategic continent and region – critical for China’s global outreach.

Global Perception of China

China’s rise is accompanied by mounting anxiety on the part of the international community. Beijing is conscious of the need to provide an alternate perception of its rise by addressing tensions surrounding it. Premier Li Keqiang spoke to the issue at a press conference held after the annual session of the national legislature in March 2013, saying: “Even if China becomes stronger, we will not seek hegemony.” The statement underlines the Chinese effort to project an image as a responsible stakeholder willing to work with other countries. The Code of Conduct to be worked upon for the South China Sea is an example. The Chinese government has demonstrated its willingness to embrace “gradual progress and consensus through consultations” as the cornerstone of the agreement.

Culture has been identified as a key tool for conveying the messages of peaceful development and harmonious coexistence. However the strategy so far has had relatively limited success. A BBC survey conducted in May 2013 across 21 countries revealed perceptions about China at their lowest since 2005.²⁴ Another survey by the Pew Research Center indicates that while people across the world may accept China’s superpower status, they “don’t like it.”²⁵ Indeed, CD, and particularly the CIs might be producing counterproductive outcomes by being identified as propagandist arms of the state.²⁶ Scholar Sheng Ding writes that many Chinese observers believe “despite their neutral scholarly appearance, the new network of Confucius Institutes does have a political agenda…. The Institutes will teach Beijing’s preferred version of Chinese, characters that are (not) used in Taiwan. This would help advance Beijing’s goal of marginalizing Taiwan in the battle for global influence.”²⁷ Other opinions suggest CIs “have been effective at expanding China’s network of relationships, but in terms of cultivating cultural soft power, they have yet to offer anything to substantiate their nominal use of Confucius as a representative of Chinese culture.”²⁸ While aggressive CD is yet to reshape global perceptions, China’s massive economic growth has generated enormous interest in its culture. Indeed, economic success has probably acted as a stronger pull for Chinese culture than its CD. In fact the success of the CIs to a large extent has been influenced by this economic pull. Several economically backward countries in Africa and Asia are inspired by China’s economic development and are keen on reproducing its economic strategies. However, such awe is much muted elsewhere and accompanied by anxiety. Niall Ferguson argues that the bloody twentieth century witnessed “the descent of the West” and “a reorientation of the world” toward the East, underscoring the future power shift from the West to the East. China’s rise, an integral part of this shift, is cause for discomfort in its immediate neighborhoods of Southeast and Northeast Asia, and, needless to say, in the West. CD has hardly been able to erase this strategic discomfort given that the world realizes that China’s cultural engagement is far more strategic and national interest-driven than pure virtuous export of cultural heritage. This could be due to several factors including reluctance to introduce domestic political reforms coupled with heavy military build-up including the recent effort for a drone development program.²⁹ The hard power implicit in these actions continues to overshadow the soft power explicit in CD.

The post China’s Cultural Diplomacy: Historical Origin, Modern Methods and Strategic Outcomes appeared first on China Research Center.