The idea that aggrieved people could bring their complaints directly to higher authorities is rooted in ancient Chinese statecraft that defined a society ruled by man – that the benevolent and wise emperor and his upright, powerful officials would correct the wrongdoings of abusive, lower-ranking officials and return justice to the people once they learned about their suffering. It was meant to check local officials, connect the people with a sense of justice from above, and thereby reinforce the emperor’s power and image.

The Chinese Communist Party launched its own petition system in 1951. The Party intended for it to serve as a bridge to closely link the government with the people by conveying the latter’s concerns to relevant authorities for possible solutions. But under Mao, petitioning was infrequently used in individual, localized cases. The increasingly widespread use of this mechanism by the Chinese from remote corners to major urban centers is a new and unique phenomenon of the post-Mao era. But the various petition offices from the region to the center do not have any real power to directly solve any specific issues. The authorities that do possess power to resolve those issues are often the root cause of the complaints in the first place. In other words, rampant institutional corruption has both enabled and disabled the petition system. As such, the system has failed to protect the people and the bridge has been under water. As many cases have lingered for years and even decades and some people have turned into full-time “petition specialists,” the system has become a trap that consumes enormous energy and resources of both the petitioner and the government without serving its stated purpose. This article takes a critical look at the petition system from the perspective of government regulations, the new trends in petitioning, and the perspective of the petitioner in an effort to provide some understanding about the current state of that system.

In October 1995 the State Council issued the “Regulations of Petition” with 44 items as a detailed nationwide guideline to respond to the mounting problems and pressures resulting from the reform. But new conflicts warranted almost immediate and ongoing update. Since then numerous documents and directives titled “petition specifics,” “petition methods,” “urgent notice on petition,” and “rules on orderly petition” were issued on matters concerning the environment, labor, welfare, stock market, mine safety and many others by various government agencies in Beijing. Provincial and municipal governments have also issued their own rules.¹ The proliferation of petition-related documents testifies to the seriousness and persistence of the matter.

Not surprisingly, in 2005, the State Council issued a new version of the regulation with 51 items, 90 percent of which was either new or different as significant additions and revisions were made to the 1995 version.² In the meantime, books and pamphlets such as, “Supplemental Reading to ‘Regulations of Petition'” and “Questions and Answers on ‘Regulations of Petition'” were rushed to bookstores and classrooms of the nation’s law schools.

The revisions of the 2005 Regulations served two purposes. One is to better “regularize,” i.e. control, the petitioners; the other is to compel local officials to take more responsibility in dealing with petitions. The revisions tried to fix a system that was close to its break point. First of all, the official term “xinfang,” defined as petition by “letter, e-mail, fax, telephone, and foot,” is misleading.³ Most petitioners use the term “shangfang”-in-person petition to higher authorities. The difference in terms reflects a significant gap between the government intention and the actual practice. While the government prefers written petitions and includes in its regulations “walk-in petition” as only one of the xinfang forms, people no longer believe that anything short of an in-person presence can resolve their cases. The 2005 revision of the Regulations of Petition was by and large prompted by the dramatic increase of in-person petition cases and also repeated petitions for the same cases. Such cases concentrated in five areas that include urban housing demolition and relocation, rural land seizure, health care, education, and the legal system. In recent years, official sources have consistently identified problems in these areas as the main contributors to heightened popular discontent and social instability in China. In the first eight months of 2004, for instance, various petition offices from the county to the central government levels witnessed 125 percent increase in such cases compared wtih the same period a year previous, of which 31 percent were repeated petitions for the same cases.⁴

The other alarming trend is the rise of group petitions, termed as “jifang” or “qunfang,” which the government is most vehemently against as any collective action spells potential trouble. The number of people who were involved in group petitions increased more than 20 percent in the first eight months of 2004 compared to the same period in 2003. Also in 2004, the petition cases received by the county, district, province, and the state petition offices grew 11 percent, 14 percent, 17 percent, and 20 percent, respectively, forming a reversed pyramid. This scale shows the ineffectiveness of the local governments in dealing with popular grievances, which in turn puts great pressure on the various state petition offices in Beijing.

Over the years petitioners have often resorted to desperate tactics as their cases drag on for years and even decades. In an extreme case, in 1991 a peasant mother in Henan province lost her 20-year-old son to brutal beatings by the local police and mine bosses. After local authorities dismissed her case, she cut her son’s head off and carried it all the way to Beijing. Thirteen years later, in 2004, she had been compensated a mere 5,000 Yuan and she was still petitioning. The local government, meanwhile, had reportedly spent 40,000 Yuan in efforts to stop her from petitioning.⁵ The petitioners have also employed other radical means that have caused violent clashes with officials, such as occupying government offices, holding up official transportation, and blocking traffic.

More and more petitioners also choose to come to Beijing during important national festivals and events such as the National Day on October 1 and the annual “two meetings” in March of the National People’s Congress and the People’s Political Consultative Conference.⁶ They protest outside those meeting places both to embarrass the government and in hopes of a chance meeting with an upright, powerful official who will magically set things right for them. The government has routinely rounded them up and sent them back to their hometowns, where some of them were beaten, detained, or put under house arrest. To better control the petitioners, the revised 2005 Regulations specify that petitioners are protected by law only when they go to designated offices at scheduled office hours, and that group representatives are limited to no more than five people. Further, those who continue with “abnormal petitions” are threatened with legal consequences.⁷

The nationwide petition movement, or more accurately, the nationwide failure of the petition system, has put the Party’s claimed highest priority – social stability and harmony – at risk and caused grave concern to Beijing. The 2005 Regulations attempted to compel local officials to improve their dealings with petitioners to reduce the numbers of petitioners coming to the capital. The Regulations connect the performance of officials in handling petition cases with their overall assessment and threaten to punish failed cadres with legal and administrative procedures. The stated purpose is to assure that people receive the same treatment from local officials as from those in Beijing and that their problems would be solved locally.⁸ The new Regulations also suggest new channels, such as e-mail and telephone, for petitioners, and broader social participation from lawyers and volunteers to help with the petition process.⁹ These new measures were intended to provide some relief to the overburdened system and to control the scope of the petition movement.

But neither the new channels nor the legal threats are likely to ease the movement any time soon. The system is inherently flawed because the sources of popular grievance, namely rampant corruption, are deeply rooted in the institutions handling the petitions. How can the people expect the very local officials who abused them to serve them justice? Also, the petition system has itself become a reason for increased and repeated petitions because it often invites revenge. One study indicates that among the 632 petitioners surveyed, 56 percent of them kept petitioning because local government, as an act of retribution, attacked and even arrested people who petitioned persistently and thus caused them additional grievances.¹⁰

On the other hand, petitioning has gained a life of its own in other ways; it has become a ritual for the petitioners. Take Shanghai as an example, where in-person petitioning is most prevalent. The main municipal petition office is conveniently located downtown, on People’s Square, with a central subway station and many bus stops nearby. There are also petition offices operated by other municipal organs, such as the Bureau of Urban Planning, and the Shanghai People’s Congress, as well as by every district government. But the municipal petition office on the People’s Square is the most popular. In cases of housing disputes involving eviction and loss of property, for instance, some of the residents would head to this office straight from their demolished homes, often carrying their elderly or sick family members on a stretcher, and others would come to show their fresh bruises and hospital records in the aftermath of a violent encounter with government-hired demolition teams.

Part of the attraction of this office, interestingly enough, is in the petitioners themselves. The office is open during the weekdays with Wednesday as the most crowded for those who have issues with demolition and relocation. They all come on Wednesday by a tacit agreement and form a kind of community with a shared plight and purpose.¹¹

Some of the residents had been full-time petitioners for more than a decade and earned a nickname of “petition specialists.” There are also star petitioners among them who take it upon themselves to study relevant official documents and to come up with new strategies and demands. They are highly recognizable, and in fact, an institution at this petition office. While their demands have not been met, they have become unusually learned, experienced, and shrewd in dealing with the authorities, with much to offer to the newcomers. Collectively, these petitioners are well-informed, resourceful, and tenacious. Sometimes they are even more informed on government policies and regulations than the officials who receive them. Any newcomers who step into this office and get their “Petition 101” also feel energized and less alone. These petitioners learn from each other how to fight for their causes, keep each other up to date on new developments, share material, and draw strength from and support one another. The municipal petition office thus has become an unofficial gathering point and self-support center for the petitioners who have built and extended a fellowship there. That the petition office has turned into a politically charged institution of sociability with its own veteran clients is perhaps the most telling evidence of its failure.

Yu Jianrong, a Chinese social scientist specializing in rural development at the Academy of Chinese Social Sciences, has done an in-depth investigation of the petition system through surveys and other means, mainly because prominent among the petitioners are peasants. In late 2004 his officially sponsored research project produced a report that recommends the elimination of the petition system altogether. His argument is at once compelling and utterly obvious: the system simply does not work. Among the 2,000 cases he studied, only three of them were resolved, not due to the institutional mechanism but because certain important individuals and enlightened officials took an interest in those three cases. He further points out the inherent flaw in the petition system that renders it useless – the lack of necessary authority to resolve the issues brought to its offices. On the other hand, according to Yu, the petition system highlights the failure of the law and thus severely diminishes its authority, since it is the legal system that was supposed to deal with most of those issues. Related to that is the reinforcement of the notion that China continues to be a society ruled by man, not by law.¹² In short, Yu concludes that the petition system is not only useless, but also harmful.

Yu’s research was part of the process the State Council initiated to review and revise the 1995 petition regulations. As the publication of the 2005 Petition Regulations indicates, the central government did not accept Yu’s suggestion to abolish the petition system. In fact, his proposal caused a heated debate and was highly controversial in China, which is hardly surprising. With the continuous spread of corruption and the weak enforcement of the law, the petition system continues to at least channel popular complaints and give the illusion of hope to people – airing social grievances often helps defuse destructive emotions, and providing illusion is a way to sustain hope when the real thing is missing. That so many petitioners have patiently appealed their cases for years is a case in point. In other words, the petition system, while not solving those cases, has nevertheless helped absorb tensions generated by reforms, at least temporarily. Also, the thousands of officials and staff involved in the petition system depend on it for their positions and jobs. Many of the petitioners I talked to were convinced that those officials and staff were in no rush to solve their cases in order to preserve their own jobs.

Opposition to closing the petition system could also come from unlikely candidates, such as the petitioners themselves who have complained about and suffered from its failure. The meaning of petition for the petitioners is a subject that deserves more attention. Many of the petitioners have endured grave losses of loved ones, homes, land, jobs and other sources of livelihood, and any meaningful focus in life that was central to their material and emotional well-being. Their quotidian lives have been shattered, as has their sense of dignity, trust, justice, and faith in friendship, community, family, and government. Yet society has refused to even acknowledge their loss, and thus denied them the necessary space and opportunity to openly and legitimately mourn that loss. It was often out of utter despair that they embarked on a petition trip, which many of them refer to as “a road with no return,” a reflection of both their determination to pursue justice to the very end and the ineffectiveness of the system.

To many of them, petition becomes not only a channel to seek justice but also an interactive ritual for mourning, a passage to restoring normalcy in life; at least that is what they have hoped for. They also incorporate petition into their daily routines, and it has indeed become a new focus in their lives. On certain weekdays they go to visit local petition offices, and during certain times of the year, – March for instance – they go to Beijing. They have their own community, with friends and acquaintances to meet and chat with on petition trips and around the petition offices. In this long and miserable journey, some of them have given up hope but cannot admit to themselves that they have been defeated. They cannot afford to lose yet another focus in life. So they press on, for petitioning seems to be the only thing left to do, with or without a purpose. Asked about the idea of abolishing the petition system, one long-time petitioner answered with a question, “Then what do I do?” They have no alternative, much less a valid alternative; the petition system has become a trap from which they see no way out.

The epidemic of institutional corruption in China has created a dysfunctional petition system that leaves both parties involved-the government and the petitioner-frustrated but dependent on it and on each other. This co-dependence perpetuates a life of its own. The system will either be invalidated by a determined, thorough reform in the political machine to eliminate corruption or else it will erode the machine itself. Until then, the system will find abundant institutional debris to sustain its inertia and justify its existence as a futile but necessary measure in this transitional period of Chinese society.

The post Bridge Under Water: The Dilemma of the Chinese Petition System appeared first on China Research Center.

Until about five years ago, most U.S.-China transactions involved U.S. direct investment in China, sourcing from China, or outsourcing manufacturing to China. Besides Hai’er, which established a manufacturing facility in South Carolina in 1999, there was practically no noticeable investment activity from China in the U.S. And even Hai’er was not a recognizable name to most Americans. That changed in 2005 when Lenovo, a Beijing-based personal-computer maker, made its historic acquisition of IBM’s personal-computers division. In 2006, Georgia saw its first direct investment from a Chinese manufacturer. Ningbo Lehui Food Machinery Co. Ltd., headquartered in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province, formed a joint venture with New Jersey-based W.Y. Industries, Inc. in Newnan, Georgia, to manufacture soy sauce and other condiments. In 2007, two more Chinese companies called Georgia home: Wenzhou-based General Protecht Group announced it would build an assembly and distribution facility for electrical products in Barnesville, Georgia; and Changsha-based Sany Heavy Industry Co., Ltd. announced it would build an assembly plant for construction machinery, and its North American headquarters, in Peachtree City, Georgia.

With this new wave of cross-border transactions coming from China to the U.S., the differences between the two countries now affect not just those who choose to do business in China. They affect a much larger group of people, including American government officials, companies that do business or are looking to do business with the investing Chinese companies, the communities the Chinese employees and executives live in, people employed by the Chinese companies, people who are neighbors to the Chinese, and many more. Differences also impact the investing Chinese companies and the people they bring from China.

It is easy to say that the U.S. and China are different. But what are the differences? What are some of the causes of these differences? And how do they affect a company’s or an individual’s business behaviors? This article explores these questions, with the belief that understanding differences will make it easier to adapt to them.

I. Different Political Systems.

China has a centralized political system. The structure of government agencies is vertical, from the central government to provincial and local governments. Within the same agency, authorities at lower levels are structurally subordinate to higher levels. A decision made at a higher level is supposed to be binding on the lower levels. For example, the decision to make Shenzhen in Guangdong Province a Special Economic Zone was made at the top leadership level, without any local input. Once the decision was made, the local government’s role was to implement that order.

This is not to say that rules and regulations promulgated by the central government will be faithfully implemented at the local level. Quite the contrary. Because of the size of the country and the distances to the central government agencies in Beijing, among other things, local government agencies may well decide what to enforce (or not to enforce) and how to interpret rules and regulations they decide to honor. Nonetheless, if a higher level government decides to undertake a project and strongly communicates that decision to the local government, the local government has an obligation to implement that decision. On the other hand, the U.S. follows a federalist system, in which power is shared between the federal government and the state governments, each enjoying its own authority within the federal framework. This is also true between state government and local governments. State governments do not have authority over certain matters that are exclusively reserved within the jurisdiction of local government, such as land use.

This difference may be puzzling to a Chinese company that has been interacting primarily with state officials at the early stage of negotiating its investment in the U.S. when it realizes later in the process that it has to “re-negotiate” the details of certain matters with the local government. Following the practices in China’s centralized political system, they wonder why the state cannot simply tell the local government what to do. On the other hand, this request would be incomprehensible to the state and local government officials, who understand the limits and boundaries of their authority. Efforts made on the state’s part to mediate discussions between a Chinese company and a third party, such as a landowner or a local government agency, can be misunderstood as negotiations with the state. It is hard for a Chinese company to understand that with regard to matters that are outside the state’s jurisdiction, the state has no authority to make binding decision.

II. Different Roles of Government.

China is, in theory and to a certain extent in reality, a Communist country. Until as recently as ten years ago, the vast majority of the country’s business enterprises were owned by the state. There was practically no line between government and business. Although China’s economy, to a large extent, has been privatized in recent years, the government and Communist Party still maintain strong control and influence over many business activities. Such control is usually reflected in the many layers of regulatory approvals that businesses are subject to. Also, historically, China is a country ruled by men rather than by law. A man of power can greatly influence a company’s business decisions and its chance of success. Although China’s legal system has improved significantly in the last decade, it is still immature and inadequate for the country’s fast-growing economy. People are still learning to rely on the legal system to protect their personal and business interests. The result of this transitional status of China’s legal system is that the government has broad discretion in implementing rules and regulations and in making decisions.

Chinese businesses are accustomed to relying on good relationships with government officials to get things done. With this mindset, dealing with U.S. government officials can be frustrating to the Chinese. For example, if Chinese investors encounter obstacles in their negotiation with a private party regarding a specific matter, they would naturally expect the state government officials who recruited them to help resolve the issues. They might have a difficult time understanding that the state officials’ powers are limited by law and that, even with the best intention to help, state officials cannot always direct private business decisions. The frustration is often mutual. From the state officials’ perspective, they do not understand why they are called upon and put into the middle of an issue that should be negotiated and resolved between private partie.

III. Different Legal Systems.

While China, under Communist rule, has always had a criminal justice system, the civil legal system has a history of less than 30 years. Modern China did not have any law program in universities until the late 1970s. China did not have any trained lawyers until the early 1980s, when this first class of law students graduated.² Judges with formal legal training came even later. Without the protection of a functional legal system, Chinese people traditionally relied on relationships, trust and gut instincts to protect their personal interests. In connection with China’s accession to the World Trade Organization, China started a major reform of its legal system in the 1990s. According to the All China Lawyers Association, a self-disciplined professional association, China has about 110,000 lawyers today.³ Although this number is insignificant compared to the number of lawyers in the U.S., particularly given the population disparity, this is a significant jump from the 5,500 lawyers that China had in 1998⁴ Moreover, according to an article recently published by BusinessWeek online,⁵in the years between 2001 and 2004, China promulgated more than 94,000 laws and regulations, almost tripling the new laws and regulations from the previous five years.

Despite these significant improvements, when compared to the U.S. legal system, China is still in a toddler stage. Many laws have not had an opportunity to be applied, interpreted and enforced. Many lack meaningful mechanisms for implementation and enforcement. Many conflict with each other. Compared with the size of the population and the economic growth of the country, the number of lawyers is severely inadequate. Moreover, China’s judicial system has not caught up with the demands of the country’s rapid economic development or the development of the written laws. There are still many judges who do not have formal legal training. Relying on the legal system to protect one’s personal and business rights is still a new concept to many in China and can be a risky proposition. As a result, handshakes, trust and gut feelings continue to play a major role in forming business relationships. Understanding a legal contract is different for the Chinese and for the Americans. For the Chinese, a contract creates a platform upon which a relationship will be built, rather than boundaries of the relationship. U.S. companies and governments often get requests from their Chinese counterparts to enter into memoranda of understanding, which are usually non-binding. While the Chinese attach great significance to these memoranda, viewing them as an announcement of a formal relationship, their U.S. counterparts usually regard them as goodwill, mere ceremonial documents. There has been much complaint that Chinese companies do not respect binding contracts. There is no doubt that dishonesty and unethical business behaviors are partly to blame for the problem, but another part of the cause is the different understanding of the role a contract plays.

IV. Cultural Differences.

1. Hierarchy

Cultural differences often color business behaviors. In China, schools of philosophy that originated in ancient times can influence the sense of morals and virtue today. For example, Confucianism, which was developed between 500 and 400 BCE, teaches that every person has a “proper position” in society. Confucianism emphasizes personal and governmental morality, correctness of social relationships, justice and sincerity. This philosophy explains, at least partially, why there is usually a strong sense of hierarchy within a Chinese entity or organization. Authorities are clearly delineated internally, and respect appropriate for each position is expected. Consider an example of how this cultural difference affected the business behavior of a Chinese company. Recently, the company had an opportunity to be showcased in some photographs that would appear on a conference brochure. The conference would be attended by hundreds of prominent business, political and community leaders from the company’s new locale. This would have been a great opportunity for the company to gain significant publicity and recognition among an influential group of people. However, the company turned down the opportunity. The reason is simple and perhaps incomprehensible to Americans. The president of the company was unavailable during the time of the photo shoot, and the vice-president did not think it would be appropriate for him to appear without his boss in photos representing the company.

In most private Chinese companies, ownership is highly concentrated in one person or a handful of people. These owners have total decision-making power. But they are not always involved in transaction negotiations, which are usually handled by lower-level officers, who may not be in direct contact with the owners. As a result, decisions may be made with incomplete or misinterpreted information. As more information is obtained, these decisions may be modified. For the U.S. parties involved in the negotiation, their Chinese counterparts may appear indecisive and unreliable. The U.S. side may not know whether an issue discussed and thought to be agreed upon at the negotiation table will later be changed.

From a Chinese company’s perspective, entering the U.S. market involves more than hiring a team of competent employees, building up a sales network, and establishing sales channels. It also means adjusting to a different culture. Executive officers who are used to being addressed properly by their titles now hear themselves called by their first names by their American business partners and customers, and even employees. They will no longer have a personal driver, which is a standard perk for many executives in China. Companies that enjoy dominant positions back home will often find that they are now just one of many companies in the U.S. And more important, they will be learning a new way of building relationships (less wining and dining, more exchanging of information), the workings of a different political and legal system, and how to use the U.S. legal system to protect their rights.

2. Gender Equality

Because of decades of isolation between China and the United States, there are a lot of misconceptions in the U.S. about the role of women in China’s business world. U.S. companies often wonder whether it is appropriate to send their female executives to the negotiating table and whether hiring qualified Chinese women for management positions would hurt their chances of success in China.

According to the Confucian teaching, a girl should defer to her father, a wife to her husband, and a widow to her son. On the other hand, Confucianism also teaches filial piety toward one’s parents, including the mother. As a result of these seemingly contradictory teachings, in ancient China women had little, if any, decision making power, even though they were highly respected and even worshipped by their children, and their desires were usually followed by their sons. Women’s roles in society obviously have evolved significantly since Confucius’ days. When the Communist Party took over China in 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed that “women hold up half the sky.” Women’s equal rights are protected by the Chinese constitution. Women stopped taking their husbands’ name when Dr. Sun Yet-sen overturned the Qing Dynasty in 1911, long before the Communist takeover. Women started working outside their homes in large numbers in the 1920s. Today, women work in most, if not all, professions and occupations in China. Many successful entrepreneurs are women. However, Chinese women face the same glass ceiling that U.S. women face. The number of women in top leadership positions is extremely low given the size of the population. Habits from thousands of years ago die hard. There is still an unspoken, and sometimes unintentional, belief that, at a certain level, women are inferior and less intelligent, and that being naïve is a virtue for women.

However, this does not mean that Chinese businessmen would not respect a female counterpart. Because of this unspoken belief that women are inferior, Chinese men usually do not expect much of women, perhaps unknowingly. But when a woman succeeds in what she does, she gains higher respect from men, compared to men in her position. For example, while it is unremarkable if a man is a lawyer, a woman lawyer would be considered outstanding and would earn added respect from men. One may call this a disguised form of discrimination. In the context of business dealings, one who understands this perception can use it to advantage.

V. Adopting the Differences

There is no question that China will continue to be a major player in the world economy. China has a population of over 1.3 billion. Although its gross domestic product has been enjoying continuous fast growth that no other country has ever experienced, its per capita GDP is far below that of the U.S. and many developed countries.⁶ On the other hand, the U.S. is undeniably a superpower in terms of economy, technology, financial sophistication, and many other aspects. The U.S. needs the consumer market that China has the potential to offer, and China needs the capital, technology and other intangibles that the U.S. has to offer. Despite the many difficulties that people have encountered and will continue to encounter, business interactions between China and the U.S. will continue. To a certain extent, they depend on each other to continue their economic growth. Business people on both sides of the ocean will have no choice but to try to adapt to the differences of the other country if they want to stay competitive and be part of this inevitable bilateral cooperation. Adaptation starts with understanding.

The post U.S. – China Differences and Their Effects on Business Behaviors appeared first on China Research Center.

If the U.S. economy hits troubled times, what will this mean for the U.S.-China economic relationship? For many companies, investors and consumers the answer will affect decisions and prospects for some time to come.

Barring a depression in the U.S., it is argued here that overall trade flows may not be substantially affected, and Chinese foreign investment into the U.S. could even get a boost and help ameliorate the economic downturn. To be sure, China’s exports to the U.S. may slow some, especially in high-end and construction related sectors, and China’s economic growth rate is expected to decrease this year. But that is due primarily to Chinese domestic issues rather than what might happen in the U.S.

Before the current U.S. economic turmoil, there were already some changes underway in the two countries’ economic relationship. First, the European Union recently surpassed the U.S. as China’s largest trading partner. Second, issues with the quality of some of the goods the U.S. was importing from China, such as toys, led to recalls and disruptions in supply. Third, leaders in China have moved to initiate policies to build domestic demand in China in order to lower the country’s reliance on exports, or external demand. Fourth, the Chinese currency peg to the dollar as been allowed to appreciate since mid 2005—to date, about 13 percent. Fifth, in addition to currency appreciation effects, inflation and other cost pressures in China have also contributed to increased prices of China’s exported products. And sixth, as a result of the new “Going Out” policy, many Chinese companies are now allowed—and in fact encouraged–to invest abroad, and some of them have begun operations in the U.S.

Despite that fact that most of these trends might be expected to dampen trade, trade between the U.S. and China has continued to grow, as has the bilateral trade deficit. U.S. imports from China increased by 18 percent in 2006 over 2005, and by 12 percent in 2007. (All trade figures are from the U.S. International Trade Commission database at www.usitc.gov.) U.S. exports to China increased 32 percent in 2006 over 2005 but only 18 percent for 2007 compared with 2006. The U.S.-China trade deficit has almost doubled since 2003, and by the end of 2007, the bilateral trade deficit had sunk to over $256 billion as compared with $233 billion in 2006.

Overall, bilateral trade flows in 2007 did not respond much to the changes described, and in fact, in some cases we see the opposite result from expectations. Even imports of toys from China were up in 2007 over 2006. Perhaps the impact of these changes will be reflected in the 2008 figures when they become available, but so far, their effects are not apparent.

What happens now if income growth in the U.S. slows? Economists expect that U.S. import trade would also slow as a result of less expected overall demand. Since approximately 16.5 percent of U.S. imports originate in China (based on 2007 figures), logically this part of the trade relationship could be affected. Exports from China in certain sectors, such as furniture, have been hit by the housing problems in the U.S. Overall U.S. exports have risen with the falling value of the dollar. Exports to China should rise as well, but this effect will be constrained by the speed at which the yuan appreciates relative to the dollar. In addition, the hope that Chinese domestic demand could substitute for a decline in exports seems unlikely any time soon. Consumption as a share of gross domestic product in China has actually fallen to less than 40 percent. This compares with over 70 percent in the U.S. economy, and over 60 percent in India. Transforming China into a modern, continental economy that drives its own growth will take more time.

The factor that could change the most as a result of a U.S. recession is Chinese inbound capital flows. As asset prices fall here, they become attractive to foreign investors generally, and Chinese investors will not be left out of the market this time. In addition, the exchange rate continues to move in the favor of foreign investors. These inflows would be the result of company investment, as opposed to the Chinese government buying U.S. treasury bills, as the falling value makes the dollar less attractive for government reserves relative to the Euro and others. Hence we can expect an additional boost to Chinese companies looking to the U.S. to do business, and to invest in assets of all types. This inward investment could very well help soften the potential economic downturn in the U.S.

In conclusion, U.S.-China trade flows appear unlikely to change a great deal due to the U.S. economic troubles; however, Chinese foreign direct investment could increase in the coming months. Therefore it is also unlikely that the U.S.-China trade deficit will decrease substantially any time soon.

Going beyond the U.S., if there are also slowdowns in the other advanced economies, such as the European Union, then there is little question that the effect on China and other countries that rely heavily on exports will be severe.

The post U.S. Economic Troubles May Affect U.S.-China Economic Relations appeared first on China Research Center.

The delegation had traveled by way of Moscow and was clearly exhausted when they landed: I found the ten men totally uncommunicative. We traveled by bus in near silence to the Mayflower Hotel in Washington where I had arranged a welcoming dinner. The elegant service was interminably slow and I thought the dinner would never end. When the waitress asked us if we would have dessert, I responded – no – everyone is tired and needs a rest. Whereupon the sixty-five year old delegation head, Gu Gongxu, suddenly came alive. In perfect English he called the waitress back to the table: “We’ll all have pie, apple pie, apple pie a la mode – I’ve waited twenty-five years for a piece of American apple pie.” The ice was broken!

Professor Gu was one of several thousand Chinese students who had studied in the United States before l949, returned to China and, after suffering for their American training in Mao’s China, led in re-connecting American and Chinese science in the l970s and l980s. When he returned to Cal Tech and the Colorado School of Mines Gu was received as a distinguished alumnus. His visit paved the way for the USGS to establish seismological monitoring stations in China which provide real time information about movements in the earth’s crust.

Today, more than thirty years after Gu’s visit, China’s science and technology are driving its economic modernization: it is a developing country with Nobel aspirations. The Chinese people are acutely aware that China’s science led the world until about the l8th century: Chinese invented paper, gunpowder, moveable type and accurately predicted Haley’s comet – all hundreds of years before the West. For the last 150 years all of China’s leaders have aspired to regain their rightful intellectual place in the world.

After the devastation of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping recognized that China needed to both train scientists and engineers abroad. Since l979 more than 700,000 students and visiting scholars have studied in the West, more than a third in the United States.While many of the younger scientists have yet to return to China, most of the visiting scholars have done so. Today this western educated group is leading China’s scientific development: 81% of the members of the Chinese Academy of Science and 54% of the members of the Chinese Academy of Engineering Sciences studied abroad.

Information, space and environmental science are among China’s top priorities. It has become a global leader in nanotechnology and stem-cell research. A new system of national laboratories includes major global diseases and plant-breeding. China’s political leaders are calling for indigenous innovation and technology that leap-frogs previous applications. China’s investment in research and higher education has increased at a higher rate than its 10% economic growth: its R&D spending now ranks #3, behind the United States and Japan.

China’s science and technology is not yet a powerhouse, but American universities and corporations believe that within a quarter of a century it will be. Accordingly, collaboration with Chinese scientists and investments in jointly operated research facilities has been accelerating. Let’s look at two aspects of this American connection: training scientists and research collaboration.

We are all aware that foreign-born American scientists and engineers play a critical role in U.S. science: 35% of our doctoral level scientists and engineers are foreign born, the largest percentage having originally come from China. The ARCS program is playing an important role in training more American-born scientists and engineers.

As in the past, the United States is the destination of choice for promising young Chinese scientists and engineers. In l986 199 Chinese received their American Ph.D.’s in science and engineering. Since l996 the number has averaged 3,000, about 11% of the total. Unlike the older visiting scholars, these younger scientists have been very slow to return to China: 90% of the students who received their doctorate in l998 were still in the United States in 2003, five years later.

Asked about this apparent brain drain, the president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences reflected the globalization of science when he responded: “I will be satisfied if they make a scientific contribution to the country that trained them, to their home country, and to the world.” If China’s economic and intellectual climate continues to improve, the number returning will grow. They will take with them both up-to-date scientific knowledge and laboratory experience but also the cultural and intellectual norms of American science. The culture of American science is already having a significant influence in China: China’s National Natural Science Foundation is modeled after NSF, and has introduced peer-reviewed funding and human-subject research guidelines.

Collaborative research with China – for both industry and academia – has become a booming business. Today there are over 1,000 foreign-funded R&D centers in China, compared to less than 200 in India. A global firm, whether IBM, Intel, Microsoft, or GE must have an R&D center in China: Motorola has l6! Likewise universities are scrambling to set up collaborative research labs in China. Yale University is probably the leader: it has seventeen departments with partnerships with 45 Chinese institutions in l6 provinces and 26 study sites all over China.

Georgia Tech, an ARCS university here in Atlanta, was one of the earliest American universities to establish collaborative programs with China. President Joseph Petit led the first American engineering education delegation to China in the mid-l970s, and by the early l980s Georgia Tech was providing training opportunities in management and engineering for Chinese students. Today it has a strong collaborative program with Shanghai’s Jiaotung University, one of China’s leading engineering schools, offering joint MA degrees in x asnd x, as well as summer and semester programs for Georgia Tech programs in China. Georgia Tech also has a collaborative research program in nanotechnology with Beijing University.

Collaborative research also extends to US Government science agencies: currently there are 30 bi-laterals in fields ranging from cancer epidemiology to clean energy to nanotechnology and genomics.

This rapid growth in scientific connections between the two countries raises important questions. Why have so many American institutions made such a huge investment in joint scientific projects with China? Why should we be collaborating with a potential competitor?

Universities and corporations give the same answer: American science and technology will benefit from collaboration with China’s rapidly developing scientific community. In explaining Yale’s China concentration, President Richard Levin cites China’s large size, its significant role on the world stage, its rapidly growing economy, and the Chinese government’s investment in top universities. In a Washington Post editorial Harvard’s Ezra Vogel writes that American universities see in China “an intellectual vitality that may be as broad and deep as the Western Renaissance.” Both Levin and Vogel emphasize that scientific collaboration leads to a greater intellectual openness in China’s academic community. Corporations are, of course, more concerned with the bottom line: they find in China a rich source of inexpensive human talent. They also believe that to compete successfully they must have a strong R&D presence in China.

The U.S. government takes a somewhat different position. Aware of both the commercial advantages but also the challenge of strategic competitiveness it maintains tough export controls on dual-use technology.

America’s scientific relationship with China will be both challenging and promising in the years ahead. Whether the problem is global health or climate change or the exploitation of space China will be a major player.

During my last trip to China in October I attended a luncheon with the president of the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences and the Director of NIH’s Fogarty International Center. I learned that there are 500 Chinese interns at NIH but relatively few American biomedical scientists studying in China. The purpose of the lunch was to open new opportunities for young biomedical scientists in both countries to work with each other.

And so, my message to the young ARC scientists whom we have honored today is: take advantage of any opportunity to travel to China as a young scientist. You will keep pace with global science and you will be ready, in an informed way, to influence US science policy toward China. With luck you will also forge professional friendships that last for decades, and that may, like those of Professor Gu Gongxu, ultimately help both nations transcend political differences and contribute to world peace.

The post China’s Science: The American Connection appeared first on China Research Center.

In the months immediately following, a number of globally minded schools in Atlanta began the process of teaching Chinese, joining the one Georgia school with a long-running high school Chinese program – North Atlanta High School. Others quickly followed, and by 2008, the aforementioned school had jumped on the bandwagon as well. Seemingly overnight, nationwide demand has made Mandarin Chinese one of the “hottest” languages for K-12 schools to teach.

National Demand for Chinese

Across the country hundreds of Chinese programs have been started in the past few years. Growth has been particularly noteworthy in California, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Boston, Chicago, Portland (Oregon), and the Bay Area. The Language of the Future Sounds Like Chinese¹ and The Future Doesn’t Speak French² have become familiar headlines, as Chinese language learning in K-12 schools has taken off. While there are no precise statistics for the number of K-12 students studying Chinese, when the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages conducted a survey in 2000, only about 5,000 students were studying Chinese in primary and secondary schools. By 2006, they estimated that number to have reached 30,000 to 50,000.³ By the end of 2008, that number is likely to be exponentially higher, given the number of schools planning to start programs as soon as they can secure qualified teachers.

A number of converging forces are fueling this rapid growth.

Fear – By way of comparison, some experts have cited the language trends of the 1960s – i.e., the study of Russian after Sputnik – and the 1980s – i.e., the study of Japanese as Japan’s economy soared – and pointed to Chinese as next in this line. In fact, Chinese is similar, yet also different: Perhaps never before has a single nation combined an economy with China’s massive potential, a huge and increasingly well-educated population, and political and military influence to boot.

Competition – Forward-thinking parents are always anxious for their children to secure the very best academic and professional opportunities. In a global economy, with increasing ties to Asia, and China in particular, learning to communicate in Chinese seems like the perfect ticket ahead. “There are unbelievable opportunities to do business in China, so there’s a need for Americans to learn the language, so we’re not left out,” says one proponent of Boston’s first Chinese immersion program.⁴Similar sentiments can now be heard nationwide.

Interest – One only needs to visit one of the Chinese language classrooms in the inner city of Chicago or Atlanta, to appreciate how enthralled elementary students are with the language and culture. Chinese, with its sharp difference from both spoken and written English, has a strong attraction for many children, and arguably youth and adults as well. In the mid-1990s, when the author was first teaching Chinese to elementary school students in New Haven, Connecticut, this strong sense of fascination was clearly on display – long before the current push for Chinese, a decade later. Give American children a choice between studying a language more closely related to English and studying Chinese, and the latter will win out, hands-down.

Educational Reform – U.S. education is troubled in more complex ways than revealed by weak standardized reading and math scores. Schools must globalize the curriculum, if they are to effectively train students for the real world of the future. Integrating Chinese into the curriculum as early as possible offers a clear way to shake things up across the board. “Efforts to improve reading, math and science skills may be on the nation’s educational forefront, but quieter efforts are being made by educators and the government to prepare children for the future by teaching them languages such as Arabic and Chinese.”⁵

China’s “Soft Power” Revolution – The Chinese government has stated that it “wants 100 million Mandarin students worldwide by 2010 (compared to the current estimate of 40 million)” and is putting real money where its mouth is. Since 2004, Beijing’s National Office for Teaching Chinese (commonly known as Hanban) has been opening Chinese language and cultural centers – Confucius Institutes – at a quickening pace across the globe.⁶ At the most recently established Institutes, moreover, one finds an increasingly direct focus on K-16 Chinese language and culture education. Hanban has also been involved in developing teacher exchange and training programs, to help fill the void of qualified Chinese language teachers. Since 2006, it has invited and sponsored thousands of school administrators from around the U.S. to visit and “experience” China.⁷ Further, it has supported the development of significant language assessment measures, including the Chinese Advanced Placement test and a revamped version of the Chinese Proficiency Test.⁸

Chinese in Georgia

The Southeast has lagged somewhat behind other regions, in the development of K-12 Chinese programs. But things are changing quickly and with the proper support, and continued collaboration along the lines we have seen in recent years, the region could quickly catch up.

In Georgia, only four high school Chinese programs existed in 2000.⁹ By 2008, more than twenty K-12 schools¹⁰ were teaching Chinese. Another ten to fifteen, meanwhile, plan to offer Chinese in the coming year. The outstanding challenges for Georgia, the region, and the nation, however, remain significant:¹¹

• Lack of well-trained teachers and educational programs to train, certify, and mentor new teachers.
• Problems of standardization and the need to develop strong performance and standards-based curricula for a new language track.
• Absence of an effective K-16 continuum or “pipeline” – In most foreign language disciplines, there is some lack of continuity between K-12 and university-level programs. With Chinese, this division is exacerbated by a number of factors, including issues of standardization, traditional teaching approaches vs. proficiency-oriented instruction, negative attitudes towards Putonghua speakers from different regions of China, and issues of hierarchy among educational institutions.
• Limited state support for K-12 foreign language programs – With only 44% of American high school students¹² taking a foreign language class, this challenge is clearly national in scope. However, in 2006 and 2007, Governor Sonny Perdue revealed a troubling lack of appreciation of the importance of teaching foreign languages, by vetoing (in 2006) and then vetoing and redirecting (in 2007) funding for Georgia’s elementary foreign language model program. Operating at 29 schools, this program has been applauded by the Center for Applied Linguistics as “a state of the art model within the field of foreign language,” “excellent by any measure,” and showing “continuous renewal of curriculum and professional development…of a high quality.”¹³ Additionally, the State has been considering removal of the two-year high school foreign language requirement for several years. With Chinese in particular, states with strong support from their legislative and executive branch officials have been doing groundbreaking work in creating some of the top K-12 Chinese language programs in the country.¹⁴ Nationally known programs in the state of Minnesota and the City of Chicago exemplify the results of such support from the top.¹⁵

What Next?

Although Georgia is on track to develop a good network of K-12 schools teaching Chinese, much remains to be done.

• Networking among as many parties as possible is particularly crucial to new Chinese programs. Formal and informal networking should take place between:

(1) K-12 schools with Chinese programs

(2) K-12 Chinese language teachers themselves, at all levels

(3) Students of Chinese – An annual conference for Chinese language students in the state or region should be organized, along with a rigorous summer language and culture program

(4) Post-secondary institutions and K-12 schools, with both having much to gain from the interaction

(5) K-12 schools and Chinese heritage schools. Since the largest teacher pool in the new and growing field of Chinese language instruction comes from Chinese heritage schools, this communication is essential. It is also useful in help bridging the native and non-native Chinese language learning gap.

• Standards and assessments for K-16 Chinese language learning need to be in place in all institutions, at all levels, and concrete, standards-based curriculum needs to be developed, based on successful, proven models. In order for this to happen at the K-12 level, Chinese teachers in new K-12 programs must be given the time, training, and outside resources necessary to develop such curriculum. University-level programs should work to create overall, broadly uniform standards, especially as they prepare to receive a “new generation” of Chinese language learners in the near future.

• Teacher Training and Mentoring – All public school teachers must be “certified,” but Chinese teachers in private schools and even those with certification (whether provisional or permanent) usually require further basic training in current pedagogy, classroom management skills, and cross-cultural issues, among other things. The majority of K-12 Chinese language teachers in Georgia come from a background of teaching at heritage schools¹⁶ – a specific, insulated atmosphere with different goals and standards of instruction. In Georgia, as in other parts of the country, there is also a need to build new pipelines for Chinese instructors (e.g., university students who are studying and majoring in Chinese), in order to create a field as diverse as the Chinese speakers of the world.

• Support from a Wide Range of Players – The most successful Chinese programs around the country have had the outspoken support of mayors, governors, state boards of education, the business community, and neighborhood communities in which the Chinese programs are being implemented. On a small scale, support from within the communities where the first Chinese programs are being started, such as the Kirkwood neighborhood surrounding Toomer Elementary, in the City of Atlanta, or the private school community of parents at The Lovett School, has proven critical. Ultimately, however, in terms of a wider support network, there is room for more direct and open involvement and support from a variety of entities across the state.

Conclusion

As every journey must begin with a single step, in Georgia, the first step toward making Chinese a language of the future has been taken. Educators and communities now need to work in collaboration, to create programs that are strong from the outset and viable for the long term.

Examples of pioneering Chinese language programs, from across Georgia’s varied primary and secondary schools, include the following:

Toomer Elementary School (Atlanta Public Schools)

In the heart of Atlanta, this K-5 elementary school began planning for implementation of its Chinese program in 2005. The local parents association was closely involved as the school applied for and received a planning grant from the State of Georgia, to support a year of careful preparation and the inauguration of the first mainstream public elementary school Chinese program in the state.¹⁷ During the 2006-07 planning year, a core group of Atlanta Public Schools, Toomer administrators and foreign language consultants visited three cities around the country where Chinese had been successfully implemented, in order to learn from their programs. They also initiated a national search for experienced and enthusiastic teachers to start the program, engaged the community in efforts to educate parents about why teaching Chinese had been established as a priority, and worked with classroom teachers to give them ideas about how to better integrate Asian studies into their classrooms, thereby facilitating a fuller integration of Chinese. A partnership with Emory University, only two miles from Toomer, was also established, which led to a successful application for the first Confucius Institute in the state of Georgia, which will open officially in March 2008 and be housed at Coan Middle School, just down the street from Toomer. When visiting Toomer’s classrooms – and especially those of the kindergarten students, who receive daily language instruction – one can immediately sense the energy and enthusiasm with which the students have embraced Chinese.

Southeast High School (Whitfield County Schools)

In the northwest corner of Georgia, at the tail end of the Appalachian mountains, lies Whitfield County. In 2005, the principal of Southeast High School expressed interest in starting Chinese, and with the assistance of the Whitfield County Schools, this idea came to fruition in the fall of 2007. Beyond the rural character of Whitfield, it is also worth noting that the school-age population in the district is approximately 46% Hispanic. For a substantial number of the 150 students who have enrolled in the first year of the program, Chinese is their third language. Given this level of enthusiasm, the other two high schools in Whitfield are also planning to start teaching Chinese in the fall of 2008 . The students at Southeast High “report that [Chinese] is a challenging language to learn.” But their teachers have seen them “rising to the challenge!”¹⁸

The Lovett School (Atlanta)

With just over 1,500 students, this independent K-12 school located in Northwest Atlanta first considered offering Chinese in the late 1990s. In 1999, the then-headmaster, Dr. Jim Hendrix, charged a team of faculty to assess the possibility of offering Chinese, and develop an implementation plan for doing so. By 2000, Chinese culture classes and elements of Chinese language were being integrated into the existing curriculum, from the elementary through the high school level, in order to pave the way for the planned introduction of Chinese. By 2002, a Chinese language class was initiated in the seventh grade, as part of the regular 7-12 foreign language course offerings – making Lovett the first school in Georgia with a six-year Chinese continuum . Five years into the program, Lovett now has three Chinese language teachers and over sixty Chinese students, and plans to offer the Chinese AP exam to the first class to come up through the ranks next year, when they will be in the twelfth grade – another first for Georgia.

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