Russo-Chinese Ties: Demographic Imbalance

There exists a deep demographic imbalance between Russia and China. Russia is a thinly populated state in a condition of severe demographic decline, determined to hang onto vast resource rich territories of eastern Siberia seized during the same period of imperial expansion that produced the other globe-spanning European empires. Next door is China with a large and dense population, voracious and rapidly growing demands for resources, and a deep sense of grievance against the Western powers, including Russia, that Chinese are taught victimized their country for a century. This situation creates deep unease among Far Eastern Russians with China’s rapidly growing power.

Russia is a nation in serious demographic crisis. Since 1989 deaths have exceeded births producing a declining Russian population. A combination of factors give it one of the lowest fertility rates in the world: high alcoholism, drug use, suicide, and imprisonment rates among males, high abortion rates among females, declining public health system combined with high HIV and tuberculosis rates, and high unemployment leading to failed marriages and abandoned families. Between 1992 and 2000, Russia’s population declined by 3 million. By 2015 it is estimated that it will decline by another 11 million. By 2010 Russia’s population will be about 142 million —- less than half the population of the United States for an area twice the size of the United States.

Currently only about 7.5 million Russians live in the Russian Far East. There is a tendency for Russians to leave that region and return to the richer, western, European Russia. Most of those that migrate westward are young. Those who stay behind tend to be older, further decreasing the fertility of the Russian Far East.

The three provinces of China’s northeast have a combined population of over 107 million. With a fairly marketized and open economy, many Chinese have some capital, market acumen, and commercial skills. High rates of economic growth leading to rapid increases in disposable income in China create strong demand for resources of all sorts. Ambitious Chinese businessmen find many opportunities in the Russian Far East. Far Eastern Russians know that to develop their economy they must integrate with China’s booming economy. Yet they are apprehensive. They know that with Chinese investment and business will come Chinese immigration, and Chinese political influence. This was one factor in Russia’s recent decision to choose Japan rather than China as its key partner in exploiting Russian Far Eastern natural gas deposits.

I suspect that over the long run, Russia will be drawn closer to the Western orbit to deal with this problem of Far Eastern demographic imbalance. I would suggest that this was one deeper meanings of President Bush’s comment during his recent Brussels speech that the West was the true Russian home. Supporting Russia as the “weak man of (east) Asia” may become a key element of U.S. policy, just as Britain once supported the Ottoman empire as the “weak man of (west) Asia” to block Russian expansion toward the Middle East. China will have to tread very lightly with Russia to prevent this from happening.

Sino-Japanese Ties: Status Rivalry

China sees its current development drive as restoring China to its rightful position as preeminent power in Asia. Japan aspires to play a greater role in Asia as a stepping-stone to becoming a “normal country” — a country with political status commensurate with its economic and technological status. From China’s perspective, however, Japan simply lacks the moral credentials to aspire to political leadership in Asia. Below this moral sentiment is recognition that Japan acting as a great power in Asia would probably produce a balance of power in the region, dooming China’s aspiration of being the recognized preeminent power there.

China and Japan have often had difficulty accommodating the other’s status demands. By the time of the Tang dynasty in the 7^th through 9^th centuries, China dealt with foreign states by insisting they acknowledge the superior position of the Chinese emperor. China did not conduct diplomacy in the modern sense. Relations with foreign states were handled via the tribute system, premised on the moral and political supremacy of China’s emperor. Most states around China — Korea, Vietnam, Siam, Mongolia — learned to accommodate this arrangement for reasons of expediency. Japan, however, refused to acknowledge that its “emperor” was inferior or subordinate to China’s emperor. For centuries this made direct contact between the Chinese and Japanese imperial courts impossible. Contact was via vassals of both who served as intermediaries. From the Chinese point of view, the very presumption of the Japanese ruler in calling himself “emperor” was egregious lesse majesty. There was only one emperor, and he lived in Changan. Japan of course had the advantage of being an island safe (until the 13^thcentury) from invasion by Chinese (Mongolian) armies.

Almost as soon as Japan became united in the 15^th century, it challenged China for supremacy in Asia. Japanese armies invaded China’s loyal tributary Korea, as a stepping stone for broader Asian conquests. Ming armies drove Japan’s armies back. In the aftermath of this defeat, Japan turned inward, not to look outward until the 19^th century. Then occurred another, well-known round of Sino-Japanese status rivalry: that of the 1930s and 1940s.

Currently, Beijing argues that Japan simply lacks the moral bona fides to serve as an Asian leader. Japan’s aggression and crimes against humanity in China and elsewhere in Asia during the 20^th century, disqualify it. Even more, Japan has (in China’s interpretation) refused to repent for those crimes. “History” disqualifies Japan as Asian leader. China’s record of suffering and noble struggle, support for other Asian peoples, and contemporary economic and technological achievements, on the other hand, eminently qualify China. This is the true meaning of the “history issue” in Sino-Japan relations. From Tokyo’s point of view the “history issue” is about the future, not about the past.

Sino-Indian Ties: Possible Loss of a Strategic Buffer

Inheriting the tradition of the British Raj in defending India, New Delhi has since independence viewed the Himalayan Mountains as a strategic defense buffer. Confronted by the Chinese revolution of 1949, India imposed on all three Himalayan states (Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim) treaties designed to keep Chinese influence out of those states, thereby maintaining the Himalayas as India’s buffer. In 1989 India brought Nepal to its knees with an economic blockade to uphold its protectorate with, and keep China out of, Nepal. Now with the Maoist insurgency threatening to take over in Nepal, India faces the possibility of loss of its traditional northern buffer.

I do not pretend to know whether the Maoist insurgents will succeed in toppling the Katmandu government and taking power. It is apparent, however, that Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world, that most of the countryside is already in rebel hands, that the Nepali monarchy has discredited itself by internal patricidal strife, and that the King’s recent suspension of democracy alienated much of Nepal’s small middle class. On the other hand, India, the United States, and Britain are providing military assistance to the royal Nepali government. It may or may not be possible for the Katmandu government to prevent a Maoist victory.

China has not supported the Nepali Maoists. Nor has it encouraged them in any way that I can ascertain. Indeed, it has tried to distance itself from the rebels. Still, if a Maoist government were actually to take power in Katmandu and call on Beijing to expand relations, Beijing would probably not refuse. Under such circumstances, Beijing would probably advice a Maoist Nepalese government to go slowly so as not to antagonize New Delhi. Social revolution has a logic of its own, however, and Nepal’s newly empowered non-elected elite might decide that uprooting entrenched patterns of economic power required ripping Nepal out of India’s economic orbit. The Qinghai-Lhasa railway, scheduled for completion in 2007, might serve as a lifeline for a Nepali economy reoriented away from India. The costs for the people of Nepal would be high, but their new revolutionary rulers might decide to accept those costs — just as Castro accepted (actually, forced on the Cuban people) the economic costs of reorienting the Cuban economy away from the United States toward the Soviet Union in the 1960s.

For Beijing, moving ahead to forge ties with a Maoist Nepal would constitute a high-risk and possibly high-cost,, but also potentially high payoff move. There is little that India could do to prevent this, and India’s defense position vis-à-vis China would be much reduced.

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Prior to Taiwan’s Legislature’s election, President Chen Shui-ban and its independence-minded Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) launched an aggressive, “in-your-face” campaign that certainly antagonized China. They proposed to create a “new Taiwan Constitution” tailor-made for the needs of the island, suggesting a referendum on a new Taiwan Constitution in 2006, and having it implemented in May 2008, just before the Olympics in Beijing. They also raised the issue of removing the name “China” from a number of public enterprises or institutions. However, despite their strong showing prior to the election, the DPP and its ally, the Taiwan Solidarity Union, failed to win the majority. Instead, the pan-Blue opposition parties (the Nationalist, People First, and New Parties) altogether captured 114 of the 225 seats in the Legislative Yuan.

After the election, President Chen toned down his pro-independence rhetoric. He named a moderate, Frank Chang-ting Hsieh, the Mayor of Kaohsiung, as the premier. Hsieh avoided the sensitive topic of name change and indicated that his priorities were practical issues such as the economy, the reconciliation with the opposition, and the cross-Strait relations. Beijing responded favorably in late January 2005, indicating its willingness to “open talks with any Taiwanese leader regardless of his past rhetoric and actions.” Adding to the reconciliatory atmosphere were the direct charter flights between both sides arranged for the Chinese New Year holidays. In late February 2005, Chen issued a 10-point joint declaration with James Soong, Chair of the People First Party, acknowledging the current definition of Taiwan’s status, and reiterating support for the Republic of China. Chen said that he would not shut the door on eventual unification with China if Beijing expressed good will. Chen’s action took the pro-independence camp by surprise and a number of them threatened to sever ties with the DPP or Chen’s administration. Soong hinted that the United States had played an important role in bringing about the consensus.

However, Taiwan’s reconciliatory posture was not sufficient to reverse the political momentum behind the ASL. The National People’s Congress enacted the law to authorize the government to employ “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Taipei immediately put on hold talks on direct charter cargo flights and holiday passenger flights, claiming that the legislation handed the Chinese military a “blank check” to attack Taiwan. In late March, Chen joined the massive demonstration held in Taipei to protest against the ASL. On the other hand, China’s Premier Wen Jiabao defended the law as a measure to ensure peace, not promote war. Clearly, the ASL contains sufficient elements for both sides to pick and choose in support of their positions, but ultimately, much of the future development depends on the perception of and reaction to the ASL, both in terms of the internal politics of both sides and in terms of the political agenda of the major powers in the Asia Pacific.

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Secondly, China is surrounded by major powers in all directions. China has always had concerns over its geopolitical security. The encirclement and containment policy the U.S. implemented during the Cold War is still not entirely gone, and it continues to serve as a constant reminder to Chinese leaders about China’s vulnerability and insecurity. South Korea, Japan and Taiwan are part of the U.S. global defense commitment. Since the end of the Cold War, the two former rivals, the Soviet Union, then later, Russia, and the United States, have indeed shown a somewhat diminished interest in the region, thus creating a partial power vacuum in this region. China has an interest in taking advantage of this shifting international balance of power and will want to expand its influence in an area that had traditionally been a Chinese sphere of influence, at least in the cultural sense. Some scholars in China believe that Southeast Asia can serve as a jumping point for China’s ascendance to great power status since Southeast Asia has become such a weak link in the superpower’s global power projection.

Thirdly, Southeast Asia is of crucial importance to China’s economic security. Southeast Asia stands between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. About 25% of international shipping goes through the South China Sea. As China continues to spread out its trade and global shipment and import more oil from Middle Eastern countries, good relations with the nations in the area will secure one of the key maritime transportation passageways. By 2020, 70% of oil and 50% of natural gas China needs will be imported, primarily through sea transit via South China Sea, from Middle East and other oil producing countries.

Finally, Southeast Asia is a vital strategic interest to China’s overall foreign policy goals. By establishing closer ties with the region, it can reduce the influence of Japan, the United States, and India. Some believe that Southeast Asia provides the key to the economic integration of the Asian region centered on China. Historically, China maintained a tributary relation with its neighbors that claimed superior political suzerain rights, albeit Chinese rulers more often granted favorable economic terms and treatment to the vassal states. Today, China will have to deal with its neighbors based on international law and the principle of sovereignty and equality. However, China’s unique geographic and demographic characteristics compel China to do more than just being one of the equals. To continue to win its neighbors’ trust, China must play a constructive role of being a stabilizer in the region, and an economic engine which can keep the region’s growth momentum for years to come. Most likely, China will continue to cultivate a big brother’s role in the region, and take a benevolent approach of giving more and demanding less. Indeed, China’s unprecedented efforts to help the troubled ASEAN countries during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1999 and the recent Tsunami disaster highlight this brotherly as well as friendly role China wants to play in the region.

Political Relations

China’s effort to mend relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors took an upward turn in 1990 when China restored its diplomatic relationship with Indochina, the largest country in the region, followed by Singapore and Brunei in 1991. In November 1991, China also normalized its relationship with Vietnam. The two countries broke off its comrade-and-brother relationship after fighting briefly in their border areas in 1979 over the dispute of Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. The normalisation of relations with China in 1990 by those Southeast Asian nations acted as a catalyst for more multilateral exchanges, which eventually let to China’s admission into the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994.

ASEAN was established on August 8, 1967 in Bangkok. It now has ten members, and a population of 530 million. In 1991, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qishen attended the ASEAN Ministerial meeting for the first time. In 1996 China became a full dialogue partner of ASEAN. In 1997, a summit meeting between ASEAN’s nine countries on the one hand, and China, on the other, was held. It was announced that the two sides established a partnership of good-neighborhood and mutual trust. Finally in 2003, China entered into a strategic partner relationship with ASEAN. The annual ten-plus-one summit meeting between China and the ASEAN ten member states provides an important mechanism for routine high-level dialogues.

Economic Relations

Trade between the two sides has reached $100 billion in 2004, a significant increase compared with the trade volumes ten years ago. China has become the largest export destination for ASEAN products. The relative share of ASEAN trade in China’s global merchandise trade increased from 5.8% in 1991 to 8.8% in 2003. Similarly,the share of China in ASEAN’s trade with the world also expanded from 2.3 % in 1991 to 7% in 2003.However, the trade balance has been unfavorable to China with a trade deficit of 16 billion in 2003.

Talks on two major cooperative programs are under way. One is the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and the other is the Trans-Asian Railroad Project linking Kunming and Singapore. Although the FTA will not be fully implemented until 2010, the combined common market will rival other similar free trade regions such as the EU and the NAFTA. It has a potential to become the world’s largest free trade area with a combined economic strength of 2 to 3 trillion U.S. dollars and a population of two billions. A free trade agreement for agricultural products has already been implemented between China and a number of Southeast countries. An ASEAN-China joint expert group report indicates that an ASEAN-China FTA will increase ASEAN’s exports to China by 48% and China’s exports to ASEAN by 55%. The report also estimated these increases in trade will increase ASEAN and China’s GDP growth by 0.9% and 0.3% respectively.

Security and Non-traditional Security Co-operations

China has territorial disputes with many of the countries in the region, especially the disputes over the Spratly Islands. To avoid military confrontations, China has expressed its willingness to solve the disputes through dialogue and peaceful means. It has settled most of the border disputes with Vietnam in recent years, including fishing right disputes in the Gulf of Tonkin. ASEAN and China have concluded a number of agreements ensuring the peace and security of the region and establishing a tranquil regional environment to pursue economic development. For example, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea in November 2002 in Cambodia, which signalled the mutual desire to promote trust and confidence to establish a regional code of conduct in the area. Nevertheless, the unilateral exploration and development of oil and gas fields in the disputed South China Sea continues.

ASEAN and China concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues in November 2002 in Cambodia, which sets the stage for substantive cooperation in the field of combating trans-national crimes, including terrorism, drug trafficking, sea piracy and trafficking in persons. An annual plan to implement the declaration was agreed to by both sides in January 2004 and efforts are underway to implement concrete cooperation activities. In 1990 ASEAN and China on a Joint Regional Plan to Achieve a Drug-Free ASEAN by 2015. China, Thailand and Burma reached agreement to jointly launch an anti-drug war in the Golden Triangle region. Information sharing and extradition are carried out. China has set up special fund to help opium growers in neighboring Laos and Myanmar to grow agricultural crops.

A Partner, not a Threat

There is no doubt that China and Southeast Asia have entered a period of peace and cooperation in their bilateral and multilateral relations. However, the rise of China as a regional and global power will cause some uneasiness among its southern neighbors. Some leaders have clearly echoed the sentiment of “China threats” that are shared by many in the West. Some worry that China is carrying out its own Monroe Doctrine and trying to play a dominant role in this region. Others see the rise of China more as an opportunity. According to Ong Keng Yong, the Secretary-General of ASEAN, “a rapidly growing China is the engine which powers regional economies and the global economic train.” He believes that increased trade with China was one reason why many of the crisis-hit economies in ASEAN recovered as quickly as they did.

ASEAN’s economic dependency on China has grown over the years. China’s growing economy has had a major impact on the economies of each country in the region. Many countries not only have benefited from the access to China’s huge market, but also from the political and financial support they receive in times of crises. During the Asian Financial Crisis, China showed strong solidarity with its southern neighbors. It resisted the pressure to devaluate its own currency, thus avoiding the worsening cycle of capital market collapses in the region. Additionally, China lobbied hard in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on providing substantial, low-conditionality funding packages for the troubled Asian economies. China supported a larger and quick relief financial package with more front-end loaded disbursement and lower conditionality for Thailand. China also helped ease the rigid fiscal constraints placed on the Indonesian aid package. In addition, China made sizable financial contributions to these aid packages. When the tsunami hit hard on many ASEAN countries in December 2004, the Chinese government responded promptly by launching the largest foreign relief operation in the country’s history. Pledges from the government sources eventually reached US$83 million, and civilian donations also reached a record of US$53 million.

Cases like the Asian Financial Crisis and the tsunami disaster relief have demonstrated the positive and constructive role China can play. As China’s economic growth continues, China’s importance to this region will continue to increase. The long-term prospect for China-Southeast Asia relations remains to be positive. The economic integration will be accelerated in the years to come as the FTA is gradually finalized. The two sides will be partners on many issues, and competitors in others. But the balance of power is inevitably becoming more in favor of China.

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One of Zoo Atlanta’s major commitments is to helping conserve the giant panda. Through our Panda Conservation Fund, we support biological monitoring, field patrols, and infrastructure in three critical panda reserves in Sichuan Province, China: Anzihe, Baodinggou and Baihe. Since 1997, an active and productive partnership with our colleagues at the Chengdu Research Base of Giant Panda Breeding (Research Base) and the Chengdu Zoo, located in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province has formed. In 1999, this resulted in Zoo Atlanta receiving a pair of giant pandas, Yang Yang (male) and Lun Lun (female), on loan from the Research Base. Together, our organizations are leaders in giant panda research on breeding, social and maternal behavior, and we actively advance husbandry and veterinary practices with our partners in China.

Zoo Atlanta is also an innovative leader in conservation education. With the support and guidance of our partners in Chengdu, we helped establish the first Conservation Education Departments in China at the Chengdu Research Base and the Chengdu Zoo. Through our relationships, we have piloted many innovative programs including pre-kindergarten programs and curriculum, volunteer programs, and family programs. These programs were designed to increase conservation awareness and conservation action on key issues such as the Asian Turtle Crisis.

As a result of these successes and at the request of the Chinese Association of Zoological Gardens (CAZG), Zoo Atlanta has designed an ambitious six-year plan to create a conservation education training program for zoos and aquariums throughout China. The Academy of Conservation Training (ACT) will be culturally relevant and will incorporate the best conservation education practices developed over the last 30 years in the United States. It consists of three phases:

• Camp and Field Trip Curriculum for children and families

• Educator Training Curriculum

• Implementation of the Academy of Conservation Training

Creation of Camp and Field Trip Curriculum for Children and Families

We have created an innovative conservation education curriculum designed to instill a conservation ethic and connect children with animals and the environment. The curriculum is based on diverse and relevant academic fields, including conservation psychology, social learning theory, socio-biology, conservation science, and empathy and moral development, while looking at cross-cultural applications. The curriculum is the foundation of our camp and field trip programs for children and families. The programs are hands-on, immersive and fun, and are designed to increase environmental stewardship by increasing empathy for and knowledge of animals and the natural world. In October 2004, we and our Chinese program coordinators conducted a four-day overnight instructor workshop for 32 teachers and implemented two three-day overnight camps for 60 students during the National Holiday at the Chengdu Research Base.

Our camp and training were highly successful and increased the knowledge, interest and empathy of students and instructors toward animals and the environment. As participating professor Li Decheng wrote, “I feel my understanding toward animals and animal conservation has risen to a new stage. Like the bright moon in the evening sky, I felt my mind is suddenly open and clear.”

We will continue to enhance and expand our curriculum as we next initiate camps at the Chengdu Zoo and continue them at the Chengdu Research Base in summer 2005. We also plan to implement school field trips in 2005-2006 at both of our partner facilities.

Educator Training Curriculum

In the United States, education and education departments serve as foundations to the mission of zoos and aquariums. However, education departments have not been a traditional part of Chinese zoos and aquariums. Therefore, if funding can be secured, we will create and test a comprehensive Educator Training Curriculum in China that will develop effective conservation educators. This curriculum will serve as the basis of ACT.

In our pilot programs, we have seen a huge interest from teachers in learning new ways to teach and inspire students. Much of traditional Chinese education is formal, and our methods of inquiry, exploration and impassioned discovery were truly embraced by the instructors.

As one middle school instructor said, “I will use the methods of education emphasizing practice, hands-on and experience. This helps arouse students’ enthusiasm and interest.” Another instructor noted that “I will emphasize experience and empathy in my teaching now, (because) to experience and tell makes students change their behavioral habits and attitude.”

Our experience in our camps has also shown us that the professors and teachers not only personally embrace our programs, but also believe they will impact their students. Another instructor wrote “I think my students or my friends will have totally new thoughts and understanding about animals because they will learn how to respect animals, love animals and live with animals in harmony (through this program).”

Finally, it is the teachers’ personal investment and embracing of our programs that show us the true impact we have had. A middle school professor told us that “Before today, I am afraid of animals. I don’t really like anything that moves. Spending time with animals today, especially seeing a white egret with the security guard, really moved me. Wherever he goes, the egret will follow him. Sometimes, the bird would land on his shoulder. They are like two loving friends talking about friendship. So, man becoming a friend with an animal is so simple.”

Zoo Atlanta is extremely excited and proud of our history of success and future plans for conservation education in China. We believe that it is only through good science and education that true conservation of the giant panda and other species can be accomplished.

We at Zoo Atlanta firmly believe that empathy and fostering a connection toanimals and the environment is the first step to creating environmental stewards. This has been substantiated by many of our participants, but one instructor put it best:

“In the past, I only know that we need to love animals and protect animals, but lacked true experience. Through (this program), I understand that we should think about things and feel things from the animal’s point of view. You will deeply feel that loving animals and saving animals are not just a few slogans. It should translate into the thoughts and action of a person. We should treat animals as persons, as friends. We should respect and love them. This means our feelings toward animals have reached a new milestone.”

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