Media Control

As I argued in my 2014 essay, media control has been gaining ground despite “potential seeds for at least a partial reordering of the dynamic tension between impulses demanding control.” Indeed, since Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, media censorship in China has been tightened not only in traditional media but also more apparently in new media sectors.

In traditional media, the two-pronged control system (the state and the party) continues to censor content ranging from news to entertainment through the unified organization State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, TV and Television of China (SAPPRFT) and the local and national branches of the Central Propaganda Department. Content considered vulgar and conducive to the promotion of blatant materialism is forbidden (Li, 2016), and new lists of forbidden programming are constantly added to a long list of already censored topics. For example, SAPPRFT issued an order in 2018 that forbids video dramas of power fights at royal courts (宫斗剧). Recently it issued a new order that further forbids a wide range of costume dramas, including those dealing with martial arts, fantasy, history, mythology, time travel, and other topics (“Zhongguo Zuijin,” 2019, March 24). As a result, several dozen costume dramas may be unable to be aired over TV or the internet.

The most stringent control occurs in the new media arena, especially on Weibo and WeChat. While the Chinese authorities found it challenging to control the internet in the early 2000s, and internet users employed parodies and spoofs to criticize and poke fun at the Chinese government (Li, 2011), information control online and over mobile phones has gained momentum. Such control aims not only to censor information but also to shape public opinion (引导舆论) through flooding these spaces with officially sanctioned and “desirable” information. In this way, the Chinese state and party hope to set the agenda and guide the formation of public opinion.

Chinese authorities are especially worried about social instability and disruptions before and during large national events and anniversaries of sensitive events. For example, China hosts the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference each year, and the Chinese authorities spare no effort in making sure that these meetings are held without any problems. The anniversary of the Tiananmen Square movement (also called the June 4^thmovement) always attracts increasing police scrutiny and media censorship. Information about the movement is purged from history books, traditional media, and the internet. Terms associated with this event such as “64,”“89,” and “Tiananmen” are filtered by China’s great firewall. This year – 2019 – is the 30^thanniversary and Chinese authorities and media operators took more stringent measures to ban public discussion. Not only did traditional media mention nothing about this movement that mobilized millions of protesters who demanded free press and democracy, but social media platforms were also compliant in tightening information. Many WeChat groups—capped at 500 each—were banned because members posted information—such as videos, articles, and comments—about the movement.

For such banned groups (often called half-ban, 半封), users of accounts registered within China cannot view or post any new content, but users of overseas accounts can continue to view and post new information. This method creates two separate spaces within the same group, thus separating users overseas and those in China. However, if all users are registered in China, the group will be completely dissolved, resulting in a complete ban. Another way is to ban accounts registered overseas and users of such accounts can only view others’ posts, but cannot post content. This method is called mouth-ban (封口). The third way is to ban an account completely (called account-ban, 全封) and the account cannot be revived in the future.

Online video programming is also tightly censored. In January 2019, China Netcasting Services Association issued an order that regulates online video, including title, commentary, dubbing, emoji, background, and other information. It includes 100 articles, specifying content that will be banned such as information attacking China’s political and legal systems, opposing the “one-China” policy, damaging the national image, damaging the image of revolutionary leaders and heroes, leaking national secrets, disrupting social instability, damaging ethnic and regional unity, opposing national religious policies, and other information (China Netcasting Services Association, 2019, January 9).

Even online emojis and pictures are subject to censorship. For example, following Xi Jinping’s and U.S. President Barack Obama’s two-day summit in California in June 2013, a Chinese artist noticed the resemblance between a picture of Xi and Obama strolling together and the cartoon characters of Winnie the Pooh and Tigger the Tiger walking together. The artist put these images together to show the similarities. Chinese censors immediately deleted the cartoon image from the Chinese internet. Various versions of Winnie the Pooh have since been blacklisted, suggesting that even harmless fun can be viewed as a challenge to Xi Jinping’s authority (Lee, 2017, July 16; Luedi, 2016, March 29). Gradually, the fictional bear has become a meme and a symbol of resistance against Xi Jinping. Because of this, Shanghai Disneyland reportedly removed Winnie the Pooh at the request of Chinese authorities (Stolworthy, 2018, November 30).

The ban is part of a broader campaign that supports the government and Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power (Luedi, 2016, March 29). In February 2018, China announced it would drop the term limit on the presidency, suggesting that Xi has absolute power to rule the country indefinitely. While this shocking move motivated many Chinese to search for opportunities to immigrate to other countries, state-owned Chinese media gave supportive coverage. What’s more, various measures were taken to make sure that resistance was suppressed. For example, many journalists were imprisoned and overseas dissidents were silenced by targeting their families at home.

In addition to China’s continuing block of foreign sites such as The New York Times, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and many others, China’s control over virtual private network (VPN) services has also become more stringent. While visitors and dissidents could use VPN to bypass China’s great firewall in the past to access foreign sites, the Chinese government has cracked down on VPN, culminating in Apple’s deletion of all VPN appsfrom its App Store in 2017. Chinese internet service providers such as China Mobile, China Unicom,and China Telecom were all ordered to block access to VPNs.

Furthermore, new laws are implemented to punish the “wrong” use of social media. For example, the Amendment (IX) to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China was adopted at the 16th Session of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on August 29, 2015, and became effective on November 1, 2015. A paragraph added in Article 219A states:

Whoever makes up any false information on the situation of any risk, epidemic disease, disaster or emergency and spreads such information on the information network or any other media, or knowingly spreads the aforesaid false information on the information network or any other media, which seriously disrupts the public order, shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not more than three years, criminal detention or surveillance; and if serious consequences have resulted, shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than seven years.

Criminalizing online information dissemination can further force people to censor themselves. Any WeChat group founders are legally responsible for information disseminated in the group. Anyone who spreads rumors to 500 people (the upper limit of a WeChat group)or more could face legal consequences. Several people were reportedly detained for spreading false information. As a result, WeChat group founders reportedly transferred the group administration right to members in other countries to avoid the risks.  An overseas Chinese person reportedly became the administrator of more than 70 WeChat groups overnight in 2017 after the new rule was publicized (Qiao, 2017, September 13).

Freedom House’s report in 2018 gave China 14 out of 100 in Freedom in the World Scores (0 = least free, 100 = most free). Among them, China’s political rights score is the least free, 7 out of 7 (1 = most free, 7 = least free); civil liberties score is 6 out of 7; and overall freedom rating is 6.5 out of 7. The reports states (Freedom House, 2018):

China’s authoritarian regime has become increasingly repressive in recent years. The ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is tightening its control over the media, online speech, religious groups, and civil society associations while undermining already modest rule-of-law reforms. The CCP leader and state president, Xi Jinping, is consolidating personal power to a degree not seen in China for decades. The country’s budding civil society and human rights movements have struggled amid a multiyear crackdown, but continue to seek avenues for protecting basic rights and sharing uncensored information, at times scoring minor victories.

In addition to the tightening of media control,the Chinese leadership has also developed new technology-driven instruments of control called the Social Credit System. While this system is not completely new, its recent development aims to utilize big data and collect any information of individuals and organizations, ranging from financial information to activities that cover economic, social, and political conduct of individuals and organizations. Specifically, the National Development and Reform Commission has already built a national credit system through sharing data and blacklisting businesses and individuals who break laws and social expectations. Other private credit entities have also been established, such as Alibaba’s Sesame Credit, Tencent Credit, and Kaola Credit, suggesting that both state and commercial agencies collaborate with each other to increase surveillance in Chinese society.

The control system involves a wide range of government agencies, commercial entities, and partnerships with private organizations. It aims to establish a comprehensive surveillance system that facilitates the development of a moral society supported by a legal and administrative monitoring system. While the primary purpose of the social credit system is to modernize China’s legal and administrative governance, it can be used to further suppress the voices of dissidents and freedom of expression. In this way, organizations’ and individuals’ political, social, and economic activities are under constant monitoring by the state through data aggregation and automation. While the credit system in the United States only collects financial data, the social credit system in China collects all kinds of data, thus making it a more powerful and dangerous surveillance instrument. Such a system has caused a lot of concern among scholars over China’s capacity to finally realize its total control over society (Creemers, 2018; Liang, Das, Kostyuk & Hussain, 2018).

China’s Soft Power, Public Diplomacy, and Challenges

China has been paying increasing attention to its soft power since 2000 (Li, 2012). As I stated in my previous essay, China has attempted to increase its soft power through foreign aid, cultural programs, and various other global programs in order to gain more attraction among foreign publics. China has also allocated huge resources to increase the international influence of Chinese media such as Xinghua News Agency, China Central TV, and Shanghai Media Group. However, China’s global outreach and projection of soft power have encountered many challenges. Specifically, I will discuss the Confucius Institute, China’s corporate globalization, and the One Belt and One Road Initiative.

Recently, China’s Confucius Institute has been under great scrutiny, especially in the United States. Launched in 2004 by the Office of Chinese Language Council International(called Hanban), the Confucius Institute has been increasingly criticized for its relationship to the Chinese Communist Party, ranging from concerns over academic freedom, institutional autonomy, control over curriculum, China’s use of it as a propaganda instrument, and the quality of the teaching faculty. As U.S.-China tensions intensify, Washington has called for American higher education institutions to close the institutes down. At least 10 have closed or announced plans to close the Confucius Institutes since 2018 (Redden, 2019, January 9). While some American educators still believe the Confucius Institute offers valuable resources for cultural exchange and that the politically motivated criticisms are unsubstantiated, such scrutiny means that China’s soft power strategy has experienced a huge backlash.

The global expansion of Chinese companies has also proved to be challenging. Since around the 2000s, the Chinese government has supported Chinese companies in going global (Li, 2016). Many companies such as Lenovo, Huawei, and Haier have established their global presences. However, the way business is conducted in China has proved to be an inherent obstacle for these companies’ global expansion, especially in the West. One example is Huawei. While Huawei is a leading global provider of information and communication technology and smartphones, its entry into the U.S. market has been constantly blocked mainly based on the alleged security risk because of Huawei’s perceived close relation with the Chinese state and party. Huawei’s 5G network has also been banned in Australia.

However, the difficulty facing Huawei is not unique. Any Chinese telecommunication and technology companies planning to enter the American and Western markets may encounter similar challenges. After all, the boundary between a government agency and a commercial entity in China is not as clearly marked as in the United States and European countries. With the Chinese government’s tight control, no company can become completely independent. Even foreign companies doing business in China are required to obey Chinese laws regarding media control and censorship. In this sense, the government practices at home actually become a hindrance when a Chinese company goes global.

Another high-profile project that China has launched recently is the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21^stCentury Maritime Silk Road, called the One Belt and One Road Initiative (OBORI). The OBORI is the most ambitious global project launched by China since the country started to open itself to capitalism in 1978. The area covers 65 percent of the world population and one-third of global GDP. Since 2013, various measures have been implemented to support this initiative, including the founding of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank.

However, views toward this initiative are mixed. For example, while some countries in Europe are receptive to China’s investment, other European countries are more cautious and insist that China must “follow international standards and not exclusively pursue its geostrategic interests” (Le Corre, 2017). This initiative also marks China’s divergence from its old foreign policy cultivated by Deng Xiaoping asking China to bide time for development and to keep a low profile. The initiative is generally viewed as having not only economic importance, but also geopolitical significance in shaping global trade policies. While it is hard to tell whether OBORI will be successful, China will definitely face tremendous political, cultural, and economic challenges to implementing the plan both at home and abroad.

Interestingly, there is a sharp contrast between China’s domestic policies and foreign policies. While China’s foreign policies often advocate for a multipolar global order that enables smaller countries to have voices so that China can increase its influence and benefit from broader global political participation, China’s domestic policies are characterized by tight control and nontransparency. The inconsistency often causes the international community to be concerned about China’s promotional rhetoric of global political participation. In order to gain credibility internationally, China has to seriously transform its own domestic policies and make them more transparent and democratic.

Conclusion

I argue that China’s control over traditional and new media has tightened tremendously since I first examined this in 2014, making China one of the least free countries in the world. China’s data-driven social credit system has the capacity to even further intensify the monitor and surveillance mechanism, thus allowing the Chinese government to have a total control over citizens and corporations. While China has actively encouraged the companies to go global, the very nature of the domestic business environment makes Chinese companies the target of suspicion because of the lack of separation between the government and the corporate world. As a consequence, China’s efforts to increase its global soft power through economic means and corporate diplomacy will encounter tremendous challenges.

References

 China Netcasting Services Association (2019, January 9). Review Guidelines and Criteria of Online Short Video (网络短视频内容审核标准细则). Accessed June 21, 2019. http://www.cnsa.cn/index.php/infomation/dynamic_details/id/69/type/2.html

Creemers, R. ( 2018, May 9 ). China’s Social Credit System: An Evolving Practice of Control. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3175792or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3175792

Freedom House (2018). Freedom in the World 2018: China Profile. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/china

Le Corre, P. (2017, May 23). Europe’s mixed views on China’s One Road, One Belt Initiative. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/05/23/europes-mixed-views-on-chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative/

Li，H. (2006). Advertising and Consumption in Post-Mao China: Between the Local and the Global. Dissertation, University of Southern California.

Li, H. (2011). Parody and resistance on the Chinese internet. In D. Herold & P. W. Marolt (Eds.),Online society in China (pp. 71-88). Routledge.

Li, H. (2012). The Chinese diaspora and China’s public diplomacy: Contentious politics for the Beijing Olympic float in the Pasadena Rose Parade. International Journal of Communication, 6, 2245–2279.

Li, H. (2014). Chinese media and culture: Dancing with chains. China Currents, 13(2).

Available: https://www.chinacenter.net/2014/china_currents/13-2/chinese-media-and-culture-dancing-with-chains/

Li, H. (2016). Advertising and consumer culture in China. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

Liang, F. Das, V. Kostyuk, N. & Hussain, M. M. (2018) Constructing a Data-Driven Society: China’s Social Credit System as a State Surveillance Infrastructure. Policy & Internet, 10 (4): 415-453

Luedi, J. (2016, March 29). Why China banned Winnie the Pooh and why it matters

https://globalriskinsights.com/2016/03/china-blacklists-winnie-pooh/

McDonell, S. (2017, Oct. 16). “中国政府如何审查你的思想？” (https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-41634026)

Qiao, L. (2017, September 13). 微信群主“移民”海外避险. https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/meiti/ql1-09132017112957.html

Redden, E. (2019, January 9). Closing Confucius Institute. https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-close-chinese-government-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing

Stolworthy, J. (2018, November 30). Winnie the Pooh ‘banned from Disneyland in China’ due to Xi Jinping meme.  https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/news/winnie-the-pooh-disneyland-china-ban-xi-jinping-meme-shanghai-president-a8660461.html

Zhonguo Zuijin Gongbu “Xian Gu Ling”: Guzhuang Ju Quanmian Jin Bo (2019, March 24). Reprinted from Ziyou Shibao. https://www.wenxuecity.com/news/2019/03/24/8183297.html

Appendix

Image 1:  Xi Jinping and Barack Obama at the Sunnyvale Summit in 2013 and the image of Winnie the Pooh and Tigger strolling together

The post New Trends in China’s Media Control at Home and Public Diplomacy Abroad appeared first on China Research Center.

The history of Chinese advertising in the broad sense can be traced back to the Song dynasty when stores used signs and words to advertise services (Wang, 2008). In the 1920s and 1930s, advertising in Shanghai was already a dynamic industry, with foreign advertising agencies and brands competing with the Chinese counterparts prior to World War II.

After the Chinese Communist Party takeover in 1949, the government gradually eliminated commercial advertising in the belief that a centralized socialist economy did not need advertising. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), almost no commercial ads existed, except for limited commercial information about exports to foreign countries (Chen, 1991).

China officially announced a resumption of commercial advertising in 1978 after the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. At this meeting, China’s paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, declared that China would shift from a political orientation – focusing on class struggle – to a more pragmatic approach – centered on economic reforms and the opening of the economy to global capital. Since then, advertising has gained strategic and symbolic importance in opening up society and developing the economy in China.

In the past few decades, Chinese advertising experienced exponential development. Foreign advertising agencies urged their global clients to enter China in 1979, right after the country opened its door to the outside world. Now foreign brands and advertisements have become an inherent part of the daily lives of Chinese consumers.

Convergence between foreign and Chinese advertising practices

The Shanghai TV Station aired China’s first foreign commercial for the Swiss Rado wristwatch in 1979. The one-minute English commercial, focusing on product information, was broadcast only twice, but it produced a huge impact in China.  Hundreds of people went to state-run local stores to inquire about the product in the next few days. Interestingly, the product was not sold in China until four years later, suggesting that the advertiser was initially more interested in image advertising than selling products since China had not yet developed a consumer market.

Coca-Cola entered China in 1979, and it was the first foreign brand that was sold in the Chinese market. The first foreign commercial that China Central Television (CCTV) – the only national TV network in China – aired was for Coca-Cola.  It caused criticism because the product was viewed as not aimed at ordinary Chinese consumers.

During the 1980s, Japanese brands and advertising achieved wide recognition. Brands such as National, Panasonic, Sony, Toshiba, and Toyota became household names among urban Chinese. Similarly, Japanese advertising agencies also achieved prominence in the Chinese market largely because Dentsu and a few other Japanese agencies collaborated closely with Chinese advertising professionals and academics. However, since the 1990s, American advertising agencies have obtained a more prominent position in China.

In the 1980s Chinese advertisers used hard-sell advertising strategies, focusing on product information and production processes (gates of factories, machinery, diligent workers, their awards, etc.).

With increasing influence of foreign advertising practices, Chinese advertisers later adopted soft-sell strategies that catered to a variety of values such as family bonding, individualism, romance, adventure, love, beauty, modernity, newness, masculinity, and femininity.

Chinese ad professionals also demonstrated a strong desire to learn from their Japanese and American counterparts. Many exchange programs were established for Chinese ad professionals to learn the newest advertising practices. Professionals working at foreign ad agencies were constantly invited to give talks about foreign advertising. With various efforts to professionalize advertising, including the establishment of professional associations, the opening of degree programs in prominent universities, and the publication of advertising books, advertising gradually became an attractive profession that elevated its lowly image of puffery to a career that ambitious young Chinese were interested in pursuing.

Initially, Chinese professionals were more interested in working at foreign advertising agencies since they provided better salaries, benefits, and training. Chinese advertising agencies were generally viewed as having a lower status. In the last decade, foreign and Chinese advertising practices have converged, largely because of the constant exchange of advertising personnel, ideas, and practices. While Chinese advertising agencies in the past offered lower pay to employees, starting in the mid-2000s Chinese ad agencies offered even higher salaries to professionals who already had experience in foreign advertising practices. Now ads in the Chinese market featuring foreign and Chinese brands look very similar. Both types of ads stress affective connections with consumers in order to generate demand.

Swinging between nationalism and cosmopolitanism

A prominent theme in Chinese advertising is the selling of nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Both foreign and Chinese brands resort to the promotion of these concepts in their ads. However, there are some subtle differences given their different origins, perceptions, and relationships with modernity. One obvious difference is that Chinese brands are more likely to resort to patriotism or nationalism as a selling strategy. Chinese brands such as Li Ning (a Chinese sportswear brand) and Hai’er (a home appliance brand) have long been selling national pride in marketing their products. Li Ning, in particular, has been inherently associated with China’s Olympic glory and “Chinese-ness.” Hai’er, on many occasions, has sold its foreign expansion as a successful story in the Chinese market not only to endorse the quality of its products, but also to claim itself as a pioneer in increasing China’s global influence. The selling of nationalism is about the reconstruction and reinforcement of traditional images, symbols, rituals, myths, and customs in the context of China’s search for national identity and modernity in an increasingly globalized world. Advertisers appropriate and reinterpret Chinese symbols, images, rituals, historical heroes, and China’s anti-imperialist history to create a narrative of patriotism, loyalty, and national glory.

The promotion of Chinese-ness is particularly seen when China hosts global events such as the Beijing Olympics, the WorldExpo, and the Asian Games. During the Beijing Olympics, foreign brands also celebrated their connections to China. For example, McDonald’s asserted “I’m lovin’ it when China wins.” Coca-Cola had a record marketing blitz with theme music “China is red” and “China is hot.” The Olympic sponsor Adidas tried everything to establish its connection with Chinese culture and national pride. Non-official sponsors such as Pepsi and Nike also made efforts to connect their products and brands to China’s rising patriotism. Such endorsements of nationalism often met with consumer approval.

Given that foreign brands already had established their cosmopolitan identity, the appropriation of nationalism made them powerful rivals of Chinese brands, which could not claim to own nationalism in China any more.  To compete with foreign brands in the Chinese market, Chinese brands also aimed to balance nationalism and cosmopolitanism.

Chinese advertisers use various strategies to make global connections and sell the globalized images to Chinese consumers. Oftentimes, such global positioning is seen as contrived “Western-ness,” either by appropriating Western symbols – including Western languages, Western models, European-style architecture, sculpture, and famous tourist sites (such as the Seine River, the Arc de Triomphe, the Louvre, the Château de Versailles, the Eiffel Tower, Cambridge, Paris and Rome) – or by selling values associated with Western modernity (such as individualism, freedom, newness, and the pursuit of pleasure). In China, Western-ness is often associated with product quality and prestige. Products with foreign sounding names are many times sold at higher prices than brands with Chinese names. As a result, many clothing brands use foreign-sounding names. And some products also make false claims about their foreign origin.

Chinese ads often juxtapose foreign and Chinese cultural symbols, projecting the celebration of universal humanity through the meeting between East and West. Chinese advertising also sells dreams of common humanity and the desire for Chinese people to be recognized in the global market. The combination of foreign and Chinese elements means that Chinese brands aim to target the growing middle class in China, which often harbors a strong desire to have more global connections, while simultaneously treasuring their roots in Chinese culture.

However, global brands often enjoy more advantages in constructing such a convergent identity. After all, their cosmopolitan identity has been established in their origins and global success. Chinese brands instead are often viewed as having contrived cosmopolitan identities.

In other words, when Chinese brands compete with global brands, they are somehow at a disadvantage because foreign brands are inherently viewed as having higher quality and prestige. Considering the product scandals in China involving contaminated baby milk, poisonous rice, and other goods of questionable quality, foreign brands are often chosen because they are considered safer and of a higher quality. Chinese consumers now use foreign agents to buy directly from Western countries, and they purchase products when traveling to Europe, the United States, Hong Kong, Japan, and South Korea.

Digital advertising

Since China joined the World Trade Organization, Chinese advertising has not only been shaped by loosening regulations, but also by digital technologies. Now companies allocate more money to digital advertising in response to rising TV advertising prices and declining readership of print media.

The rapid development of digital and mobile advertising has seriously challenged traditional advertisers. For example, Baidu—on online portal–has already surpassed CCTV to become the largest advertiser in China, forcing CCTV to collaborate with new players.

Digital advertising focuses more on consumer participation, branded entertainment, and fan-centered advertising strategies. The pervasive use of digital advertising also means that it is becoming more difficult for Chinese regulators to administer advertising, thus leading to an increasing number of illegal, offensive, and controversial ads in China. Controversial advertising not only includes problematic products, but also the problematic use of questionable symbols, images, and words.

While there is hope that digital advertising will flatten the advertising gaps between Chinese and foreign advertisers and between Chinese and foreign advertising agencies, foreign brands and their agencies still enjoy some advantages because of their extensive networking, know-how, and capital. A vast number of Chinese ad agencies and brands still compete at the lower end. The global economic recession of 2008 has increased the Chinese market, which may lead to different dynamics in China’s advertising market in the future.

Conclusion

Chinese advertising is a dynamic industry and profession, which is closely related to China’s economic development in general. China’s rapid economic development amid the global recession makes the Chinese more significant. However, the Chinese economy is now slowing down, as Europe and the U.S. are recovering, which may further shape how China is perceived. Nevertheless, a sense of national pride among the Chinese consumer-citizens has strengthened, which influences advertisers and will shape advertising strategies in the future.

The post Advertising in China appeared first on China Research Center.

This essay does not aim to provide a comprehensive commentary on China’s recent cultural policies as they relate to the Decision. Instead, it focuses on the intersection between cultural and media policies and the push and pull between the party-state and aggressive market-oriented media producers. Specifically, the essay will highlight some potential changes in the following six areas: (1) control mechanisms, (2) the prescribed nature of a media organization, (3) media censorship, (4) media consolidation and economies of scale, (5) the entry of private capital into the Chinese media industries, and (6) China’s soft power and public diplomacy.

First, the Decision stresses the government’s role as administrator rather than player in managing cultural agencies. This is framed as a measure to further cultural reforms that aim to separate operations of the government from those of the enterprise. Specifically, the Decision proposes to establish unified management organizations linking party and state to administer cultural staff, affairs, capital, and orientation. This opens the possibility of changing what has been a dual-track media control system in China.

Generally speaking, Chinese media have been regulated and controlled both by a Party and an administrative system. The Party system is represented by the Central Propaganda Ministry and its branches at the provincial, district and county levels. The administrative system is represented by various ministries under the State Council and the nationwide branches of each ministry. For example, TV and radio have been regulated by the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT); print media, audio, and video by the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP); and the Internet by the Ministry of Industry and Technology Information. In 2013, SARFT merged with GAPP to form a new body called the State Administration of Press, Publications, Radio, Film, and Television. The new body, whose name has been widely criticized by netizens for its lack of creativity, aims to streamline China’s regulation over both print and broadcast media.

China’s Central Propaganda Department and its branches monitor media content and can stop problematic programs at any time by issuing formal or informal notices or oral directives. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, shaping culture has always been a key official mission of the government and the Party. Except for a few years during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the Chinese Communist Party has maintained tight, centralized control over Chinese media (Zhao, 2008). Various ministries also participate in controlling media content. For example, China’s State Language Affairs Commission, which seeks to standardize Chinese language and enforce proper pronunciation in China, can file official complaints about problematic content. Given the tradition of the Communist Party’s pervasive ideological control involving many different government agencies, a transition away from the current structure is likely to encounter resistance at various levels.

Second, the Decision emphasizes the dual role of a Chinese cultural organization as both an instrument of social control and a business, with social benefits prioritized over economic benefits. While this kind of positioning is not new, the statement could be viewed as a corrective measure, aiming to rectify media practices in China that overemphasize economic benefits, as discussed below.

In the era of reform, media organizations have been told to simultaneously serve as an official organ of the state and at the same time rise or fall based on market forces (Zhao, 1998, 2008). In the last few decades, the Chinese government has gradually reduced subsidies and the vast majority of Chinese media now rely predominantly or solely on advertising as a source of income. The market now plays a key role in dictating media content, as evidenced by the importance of the ratings system and the booming entertainment culture.

The media ratings system was introduced in China in the late 1990s. Now, CCTV-controlled Yangshi Suofurui, with its shortened English name CSM, is the most important media research firm in China. Firms that monitor print media, radio, outdoor media, and the Internet have also been established since the early1990s. Among them, Hui Cong, established in 1992, is one of the most important, currently monitoring more than 1,400 print outlets and more than 7,000 Internet sites. Ratings have become a common currency of exchange and the most important criterion in dictating a TV station’s programming and daily practices. CCTV even implemented a system called “the last rated program out” in 2002, which means the lowest rated program gets canceled first. Although the CCTV system was replaced by a more comprehensive evaluation mechanism in 2011 that stresses four dimensions, including a program’s leadership power, influence, communicative power, and professionalism, ratings still take up more than 50 percent of the weight in the equation (Chinanews.com, 2011, Aug. 12).

An entertainment culture has boomed since the late 1990s with the rise of media metrics. Entertainment programming often is less controlled and more profitable that other types of content. Many provincial satellite TV channels have launched entertainment programs to increase their competitiveness in an economy that depends on eyeballs. Hunan Satellite TV (HSTV) in particular has become a successful model. Starting with its flagship program Happy Camp, a variety show that debuted in July 1997, and its subsequent dating program The Promise of Rose (running from July 16, 1998 to August 25, 2005), HSTV has distinguished itself by celebrating happiness and youth culture. Other stations followed suit and attempted to differentiate themselves either through TV dramas, martial arts, localized storytelling or other types of programming.

Chinese authorities often show ambivalent attitudes toward media entertainment, fostering the boom on the one hand but attempting to control it on the other. A number of policies and regulations have been issued by China’s SARFT to control the “over-entertaining” trend in Chinese media. Entertainment is often criticized by the authorities as promoting vulgarization, infotainment, and celebrity gossip. For example, SARFT issued an order requiring that no satellite TV channel, starting in July 2011, should air entertainment programs more than three times a week in prime time from 17:00 to 22:00. This example demonstrates an inherent contradiction in the dual functions of Chinese media.

Third, the Decision speaks to censorship. It aims to improve ideological control mechanisms, enhance the management of media infrastructure and content, establish “a unified mechanism to prevent and strike online crimes,” and “improve the mechanism to handle unexpected events over the Internet” so as to “form a working framework that combines direct guidance and administration under the law.” It further calls for “the institutionalization of news releases, tightening of the journalist qualifications, management of new media^[1], and the regulation of the communicative order.” In a way, the Decision proposes to tighten ideological controls and online censorship, probably as a response to the fragmentation of the Chinese media market and the threat posed by new media, such as social media and mobile phones.

Indeed, many observers and analysts have pointed out that since Xi Jinping took power, control over the Internet has been increased. Most recently, China issued a document called “Temporary Rules for Managing Instantaneous Communication Tools and Public Information Service Development,” which aims to manage and censor information distribution. However, authorities have always been struggling with the issues of control over media. There has never been a clear line about what is allowed and what is not. There is no single media law in China, and scholars have been discussing whether the state should adopt one. Chinese media are now regulated by scattered regulations, orders, and circulars, and the control regime is ambiguous, combining formal and informal controls. Arguably, the lack of formal boundaries makes censorship effective. Media workers often censor themselves to a degree that goes further than the often unclear official guidelines.

Other controls are being put in place. Chinese people have long had to obtain state-issued work certificates (shanggang zheng) to work in media organizations, and regulations are being tightened. Recently, regulations were implemented to prevent people on social media from distributing news unless they are licensed to do so. As the least controlled sector, advertising traditionally has been under less scrutiny. However, a 2007 decree issued jointly by the Ministry of the Personnel (currently the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security) and the State Administration of Industry and Commerce initiated the practice of certifying ad workers. This decree specifies criteria used to evaluate and grant the certificates of “assistant advertising expert,” “advertising expert,” and “senior advertising expert” through annual exams overseen by the Chinese Advertising Association. In 2011, the first qualifying exam was held and the subjects tested include advertising laws and regulations, practices, copywriting, design, and planning. The practice makes China the only country that grants official certifications to advertising workers.

Fourth, the Decision continues to stress media consolidation and economies of scale. It states that “a special shareholding policy will be applied to state-owned media that are reformed according to state policies.” It also stipulates that China will “push consolidation and acquisitions of cultural enterprises across geography, industry, and different kinds of ownership and improve the scale, concentration, and professionalism of the cultural industries.” This is a response to the exponential media growth in China in the last few decades and to the competition posed by large foreign media. A staple slogan in Chinese media industries since the late 1990s calls for enterprises to “become larger and stronger.” In the last two decades, Chinese media have been characterized by a rapid expansion as well as a simultaneous consolidation under the direction of the government as a way to enhance their competitiveness prior to China’s entry into the WTO.

Media consolidation started in 1996 with the formation of the Guangzhou Daily Newspaper group. By 2003, China had established 69 media groups, including 38 newspaper groups, 13 broadcasting groups, one magazine group, nine book publishing groups, five distribution groups, and three film groups (“Zhongguo chuanmeijituan fazhan baogao,” 2004). In May 2011, China News and Publishing Group was founded. Not officially allowed to form cross-media groups, most conglomerates are based on single medium and related entities, or geography. The Decision means that in the future cross-media groups can be formed. Media organizations from different industries and different places can be consolidated. Consolidation is a means to achieve economies of scale as well as a way to support government control over previously fragmented media (Zhao, 1998, 2008).

Fifth, the Decision aims to further promote the development of private capital in China’s media market. It encourages private cultural enterprises, lowers the threshold of entry, and allows private capitalists to be involved in overseas publishing and online publishing businesses and in holding shares of state-owned film production, cultural, and arts organizations. It also states that China will increase government subsidies, cultural purchases, and copyright protections. This is evidence of China’s effort to develop its culture industries domestically and internationally.

While allowing private capital into media industries is not entirely new, it can potentially lead to new practices. In the past, private capital was mainly allowed in the areas of production and distribution. Since the late 1980s, TV stations have started to purchase programs on the market, inaugurating a system that separates the producer from the broadcaster. Since the 1990s, state authorities have begun to more aggressively promote the system and allow private capital to enter the TV market. TV drama is the first area that has witnessed the penetration of private capital. It is a common practice now for TV stations to buy programs produced by others. Now, the stages seems to be set for a broadening of the embrace of private capital in media.

While Chinese TV producers initially only cloned successful foreign programs, starting with HSTV’s highly influential show Super Girl, they have in recent years begun to purchase global programming, such as Ugly Betty (debuting in 2008 and licensed from Televisa), If You Are the One (debuting in 2010 based on the UK program Take Me Out), China’s Got Talent (deputing in 2010 and licensed from UK-based FremantleMedia), Daddy, Where Are We Going? (debuting in October 2013 and licensed from a South Korean producer), Voice of China (debuting in July 2012 and licensed from the Dutch program The Voice of Holland), Chinese Dream Show (debuting in April 2011 and licensed from BBC) and so forth.

Fashion magazines have long entered the Chinese market through licensing or partnership with a local publisher (Fritha & Yang, 2009). For example, the Hearst Corporation from the U.S. started to publish a Chinese version of Cosmopolitan in 1993. Harper’s launched the Chinese version of Harper’s Bazaar in 2001, and the Chinese version of Vogue was introduced in 2005. Japanese magazines such as Vivi, With, Style, Oggi and CanCam have also launched Chinese versions in the 2000s. Given that most of these magazines are advertising vehicles, content is less controlled than news programs. In the book publication area, U.S. publisher Simon & Schuster started to collaborate with Chinese publishers in the late 1990s in licensing or co-publishing deals.

Lastly, the Decision stresses China’s public diplomacy. Since the turn of the 21^st century, China has attempted to increase its comprehensive power, which includes a higher international profile and soft power. In addition to increasing China’s international aid and participation in global affairs, an important step has been the spread of Chinese culture through Confucius Institutes. China has founded more than 300 Confucius Institutes worldwide. Interestingly, promotion of Chinese culture overseas emphasizes ideology as well as economic benefits. Recently, Confucius Institutes in the U.S. has been under increasing scrutiny.

While there is no doubt that China’s international influence has increased recently, there is a general consensus that China’s soft power mainly emanates from its conformity to international norms rather than its power to shape global policies (Li, 2009). Li (2009) argues that China’s soft power concerns “the soft use of power.” China has not yet taken a leading role in international affairs except in the case of climate change. Also, there is a deep suspicion toward China in the West. While China has allocated huge amounts of money for state-owned media such as Xinghua News Agency, China Central TV, and Shanghai Media Group to increase their international influence, gaining credibility is a major challenge for these media outlets. Competition for viewers in other countries is always contentious (Price, 2002), but China faces a unique challenge because of its Communist ideology, state control, and the West’s anxiety about China’s rise.

In this essay, I discussed potential changes in China’s media control mechanisms, the dual role of China media, censorship, media consolidation, the entry of private capital into the Chinese media industries, and China’s soft power and public diplomacy. In summary, it seems that the Decision largely aims to further promote the economic function of culture and media industries and control their ideological function. It would not be surprising if we see China implementing tighter controls over the Internet and social media and simultaneously encouraging entrepreneurship and creativity. To a large extent, culture and media industries are dancing with chains. They are allowed to become economic entities that only disseminate non-threatening cultural contents. Chinese media aiming to expand internationally will encounter even more challenges. After all, they may continue to be viewed as the Chinese Communist Party’s mouthpieces. Their dual roles will be constantly tested and contested in the domestic and international markets. One more note: the Decision only prescribes the rules for the media and cultural industries, but the practices may be different.

References

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Fritha, K., & Yang, F. (2009). Transnational cultural flows: An analysis of women’s magazines in China. Chinese Journal Of Communication, 2(2), 158-173. doi:10.1080/17544750902826681

Li, H. (2010). Chinese Diaspora, the Internet, and the image of China: A case study of the Beijing Olympic torch relay. In J. Wang (ed.), Soft power in China: Public diplomacy through Communication (pp. 135-156). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Li, H. (2013). China’s media transformation and audience studies. In A. N. Valdivia (Gen. Ed.) & R. Parameswaran (Ed.), The international encyclopedia of media studies. Vol. 3: Audience and interpretation in media studies (pp.341-364). Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.

Li, M. (2009) (ed.). Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics. Lanham, MA: Lexington Book.

Price, M. (2002). Media and sovereignty: The global information revolution and its challenge to state power. The MIT Press.

Wang, J. (2011). Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication. New York: Plagrave Macmillan.

Zhao, Y. (1998). Media, Market and Democracy in China. University of Illinois Press.

Zhao, Y. (2008). Communication in China. Rowman & Littlefield

“Zhongguo chuanmeijituan fazhan baogo” (2004, May). Zhongguo chuanmeijituan fazhan baogao. Changsha, China: Hunan Jiaoyu Chubanshe.

^[1] Many observers believe the party-state’s aim is to converge new and old media so as to maintain the dominance of traditional outlets and thereby maintain ideological control.

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